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ABSTRACT
After military service is over, veterans are left to try to acclimate to their new lives. They
take the lessons learned through their military career and they apply it to their daily life. One area
of veteran life that remains understudied is the way that military service, combat experience
specifically, alters political attitudes and behavior. The main focus of this dissertation is to
understand the way that military combat alters political attitudes among military veterans.
Instead of analyzing military veterans as one homogenous group, I separate veterans by combat
experience. Building from the military psychology literature on combat trauma, I develop a new
measure of combat experience that conceptualizes the different facets of witnessing military
combat. To empirically test for the associations between my new measure of combat experience
and political attitudes, I fielded an original survey of 1000 civilians and an oversample of 200
military veterans to test military veterans’ social identity, foreign policy attitudes, and trust in
government. The findings show that military veterans who witness traumatic combat events are
more likely to identify as a veteran, hold less hawkish foreign policy attitudes than non-combat
veterans and civilians, and that military veterans have more trust in government than do civilians.
These findings provide evidence that experiencing military combat can alter the political
attitudes of military veterans.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
My dissertation begins by highlighting the importance of veterans’ studies, some of the
difficulties that veterans endure reintegrating into society, and theorizing about how combat
affects veterans’ preferences and political behavior. This introduction provides an understanding
on why studying veterans is an important and worthwhile venture for the advancement of
comprehending their place in society in multidisciplinary settings, including political science.
The rest of the introduction discusses the place of veterans within society: self-selection or
socialization of military veterans, transitioning back into society, and the effects of combat on
military service members.

Self-Selection or Socialization of Military Veterans
The general focus of a substantial amount of veterans’ literature is that self-selection is
what drives some members to enlist while others opt out (Cockerman 1978, Dorman 1976,
Schreiber 1979). However, an individual may be able to be trained in the way to think like a
military member (i.e., the military may socialize the service member into becoming what the
military expects). Socialization is evident, especially through the orders commanded down
through the chain of command (Shay 1994). Ultimately, studying veterans requires an
understanding that the service members who are returning back home to reintegrate into society
are inherently different from those that they spent their time fighting to defend. This could be
due to the way that prospective military members decided to join, referred to as self-selection
(Bachman, Sigelman and Diamond 1987, Cockerman 1978, Dorman 1976, E. M. Schreiber
1

1979), or from the cumulative effects that the military incorporates into service members,
referred to as socialization (Bachman, Sigelman and Diamond 1987, Dorman 1976, Shay 1994).
Self-selection for military members assumes that there are characteristics or traits that lead the
individuals towards joining the military (Bachman, et al. 2000). This assumes that these
individuals have certain features that are aligned with those that are currently served or have
already served. Socialization for military members assumes that the effects of military service
condition the member throughout their time in service. Using self-selection and the socialization
theories, we can assume then that even if service members do not experience combat during their
time in the armed forces, they still leave (and perhaps even entered) different from citizens who
did not enlist or serve in the military.

Veteran Reintegration
Once military members leave the service they are confronted with reintegration into
society. Reintegration can be problematic for some veterans when they face social and
occupational adaptation challenges (Elnitsky, et al. 2017). Military veterans were used to a life
where they had orders they had to follow and a chain of command to refer to when questions
arose. When they rejoin society, those instructions and order are gone and military veterans are
left to their own devices to make sense of the chaotic world outside the military institutional
structure. Depending on the severity of injuries sustained during their time in the service,
military veterans will stay engaged with the government through the Veterans Administration
(VA). This service is important for mental and physical healthcare. Continual interaction with
this government service helps to take care of military veterans concerns and medical issues, but
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only two-thirds of those with recent experiences with the VA had positive impressions of it
(American Customer Satisfaction Index 2017). 1
In addition, because many service members enter into the service at age 18, they forgo
college degrees in order to serve their country. On top of reintegration into an overall societal
framework, veterans are also attempting to acclimate into educational surroundings with students
far younger than them, often times resulting in difficult situations (Ahern, et al. 2015, Koenig, et
al. 2014). Assimilating with college students who are much younger can be difficult, especially
when a military veteran has just come from a stressful work environment that may require them
to put their life on the line for their country and their classmate’s main concern is an assignment
or other societal college worries. This can lead to disassociated feelings when military members
are separated from the core group of individuals who supported them while in the military and
are then placed into a new setting with unknown individuals with dissimilar life experiences
(Hinojosa and Hinojosa 2011). The two stark differences in perceived severity of imminent
stresses can potentially cause problems for military veterans who are used to more stressful
situations.
As of 2016, the United States Census Bureau reported that 7.4% of the population were
military veterans (United States Census Bureau 2016). This is a sizable portion of the population
that not only was employed by the federal government, but also are individuals who understand
the actions of the government from a different perspective. This is not to say that military
members (current and former) know more or know better than non-military civilians; rather,
military members likely come to an understanding of the government’s action from a different

1

Rating it ahead of only two federal departments: Treasury and Housing and Urban
Development (HUD)
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viewpoint. It is this unique perspective that my dissertation will focus on and elaborate in ways
that extends prior scholarly work. Most importantly, my dissertation examines not only the
differences between military veterans and non-military civilians, but also examines differences
among military members—specifically, between those who have and have not experienced
combat.

The Effects of Combat on Military Veterans
Not all members of the military actually witness the effects of combat. In the midst of the
military campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003, service members reported engaging in
combat scenarios (witnessing mortar attacks, gunfire exchanges, seeing the deaths of friendly or
enemy combatants, seeing or participating in the death of non-combatants) in large numbers
(Hoge, et al. 2004). More military members stationed in the invasion of Iraq reported witnessing
combat scenarios than did members stationed in Afghanistan (Hoge, et al. 2004). This level of
combat has not been sustained from 2003 until present. First, in FY 2003 almost 28% of the
active duty personnel were stationed overseas (Kane 2004). As of March 2018, less than 13% of
the active duty military personnel were stationed overseas (Defense Manpower Data Center
2018). Second, not only is that a more than 50 percent reduction in the amount of forces
stationed overseas, it also indicates that the United States is not waging the same type of
offensive that made up the early invasion into Afghanistan and Iraq. The type of conflicts that
the United States is currently engaged in is not the same as it was after the attacks of September
11, 2001. Thus, with less individuals going overseas and/or experiencing combat scenarios, the
likelihood that service members engage in combat is far less. Therefore, while we would not
expect service members to have identical service experiences, there are likely more service
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members who go through their entire military career who do not engage an adversary with
deadly means.
Although the Department of Defense keeps track of the service members stationed
overseas, the individuals who are stationed in combat zones do not spend their entire military
career stationed in one specific location. Military members are prone to relocate and to
experience different duty stations during their tenure in the military. Military members are also
able to end their tenure in the armed forces whenever their contract runs out, which results in
them having to reintegrate into society. Combat can make adjusting back into society different
for at least three reasons. First, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or other somatic
difficulties are sometimes problematic in adjusting to life outside of the military (Bremner, et al.
1992, Bremner, et al. 1996). Second, there could be a sense among non-military civilians that
veterans who return back home who have not experienced combat are seen as somewhat “lesser”
than their counterparts who have engaged in combat scenarios (Eckman 2016). In addition, this
feeling could potentially be a creation of the service member to feel less than others because they
did not end up being in a tour that involved combat situations. Last, the difference between
experiencing combat and not experiencing combat can alter the perceptions and views of military
members. It is this point that my dissertation focuses on, as I highlight the specific areas where
the differences in combat experience may affect the political attitudes and behavior of military
veterans.

Chapter Summary
In Chapter 2, I analyze the theoretical underpinnings to why we would expect the trauma
of combat to matter for the political behaviors of military service members and the ways that the
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previous measurements of combat have fallen short. Specifically, I discuss the six categories of
possible traumatic deployment experiences. These include: moral injury by self, moral injury by
others, traumatic loss, life threat to self, life threat to others, and aftermath of violence (Stein, et
al. 2012). In addition, I construct a new measure to account for military combat trauma
experience. I use five different combat events (witnessing the effects of an IED, exchanging
gunfire with the enemy, witnessing the deaths of “friendlies,” deaths of enemies, and deaths of
civilians) in order to account for the psychological toll that combat trauma has on service
members (Hoge, et al. 2004, Stein, et al. 2012). My new measure of combat allows me to
understand the different violations to psychological processes that may alter political beliefs and
behavior for military combat veterans.
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) seeks to understand what it means to be a veteran,
and how serving in the armed forces conditions how veterans view their sense of identity. Using
a national survey sample with an oversample of veterans, I find that veterans have a stronger
sense of identity as a veteran, measured both in terms of self-identification as a veteran and a
feeling of closeness to the veteran group, compared to civilians. I also find that, among military
veterans, combat experience and valuing time in the military leads to a greater sense of
identification as a “veteran.” Moreover, I find that even some non-military members report a
greater sense of identity with veterans than others. I compare the effect of this “veteran” identity
to that of partisan identity and find that, for most veterans, there is a greater sense of attachment
to the veteran identity than to their partisan identity. Finally, I find that veteran identity has an
important, independent influence on veterans’ and civilians’ views on military spending. These
findings suggest that there is a veteran identity that military members and civilians attach
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themselves to that is stronger than partisanship for some individuals, and is associated with
certain policy positions.
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) examines the foreign policy preferences of
veterans and non-military civilians. Prior work on the effect of combat on veterans typically
measures combat experience as a dichotomous event. I extend work in this area by using my new
measure of combat experience to see how that associates with the veteran’s outlook on foreign
policy. This chapter also uses the original survey referenced in Chapter 3, which asks for
multiple types of military combat experience, as well as foreign policy positions. Consistent with
previous research, I find that veterans tend to be more hawkish than civilians. When I account for
the veterans’ number of unique combat experiences, however, I find that the more combat
experiences that veterans endure, the less hawkish their foreign policy positions are. Moreover,
consistent with literature from military psychology, this association only holds for veterans who
express more regret about their time in the military.
The final empirical chapter (Chapter 5) focuses on levels of trust in government and how
they vary depending on the combat experience of veterans. I advance a theory that, in
experiencing combat, military veterans are trained and conditioned to accomplish certain mission
objectives on behalf of the government and therefore should have higher levels of trust in
government compared to civilians and those service members without combat experience. In
contrast, non-combat military veterans have a more difficult time putting faith in the government
that trained them to fight given that they ultimately do not fulfill this aspect of their training. In
order to address this idea, I use the data from my original survey and compare perceptions of
trust in the government among the same three groups of individuals from the previous chapter
(combat veterans, non-combat veterans, and non-military civilians). Using my novel measure of
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combat experience, I find that the more combat experiences a military member had, the more
trusting they are in government. In addition, I find similar results when using a more traditional
measure of combat experience in the 2012 American National Election Studies (ANES). I also
find a theoretically predicted interactive effect of military veteran’s combat experience and age
on trust in government; as age increases, the effect of combat experience on trust wanes.
The concluding chapter summarizes the findings from the three previous empirical
chapters and discusses the implications going forward for conceptualizing combat veterans in a
different way. If combat veterans are as different from non-combat veterans as I posit, then I
believe the way that we study them should change. A simple dichotomous combat variable will
not suffice for every instance when comparing combat to non-combat veterans. This realization
shall pave the way for new research on a broad spectrum of new topics that we may see as
common for non-military civilians, but may in fact behoove researchers to focus on veterans and
highlight those differences.
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CHAPTER 2: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TOLL OF MILITARY COMBAT TRAUMA
Not all battles that service members encounter happen on a battlefield. Long after service
members return home, the (psychological) battle rages on with the continuation of identifiable
traumatic episodes that they encountered during their service commitment (Fontana, Rosenheck
and Brett 1992). Additionally, military transition theory posits that the disconnect from the
shared identity and cultural similarities that service members had in the military, makes it even
more difficult for veterans adjusting to life outside of the military (Castro and Kintzle 2014).
Clearly, the actions undertaken during military service have longstanding repercussions on the
attitudes and interactions that military service members form and cultivate after their service
commitment ends. Post-service interactions from familial relations (Borus 1973, Lincoln, Swift
and Shorteno-Fraser 2008) to employment opportunities (David, Duggan and Lyle 2011) and
even the will to live (Bryan, et al. 2013) have been shown to be affected by actions undertaken
during military service.
This chapter theorizes about the effects of combat trauma and how those effects can be
moderated by the type of combat a service members experiences, discusses how combat trauma
has been measured previously, and charts a path forward for measuring and conceptualizing the
effects of combat trauma. Specifically, this chapter leads to a discussion of how combat
experience may alter the political behavior of veterans. Building from the previous literature on
the effects of combat trauma and the myriad issues surrounding the effects of combat trauma, I
posit that political beliefs and behaviors are altered by something more than military service
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alone. In fact, it is experiencing different psychological affects due to combat exposure that leads
to attitudinal and behavioral changes in military veterans.
Types of Combat Experiences
One of the factors that makes studying service members so compelling is that generally
when an individual joins the Armed Forces they do so with a somewhat similar likelihood to
have combat experience. In fact, there is the random chance of experiencing combat when a
service member is deployed to an area that is in a combat zone, or one that is likely to experience
combat events. However, not all deployments to combat zones end with the service member
having experienced combat. Therefore, better understanding the types and instances of combat
among service members is paramount for those who are concerned with the effects that combat
exposure may have on behavioral processes.
Two of the main types of combat experiences that service members may encounter are
either through personal or shared contact with combat events or through experiences involving
the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. Service members with personal combat experience who
return from deployments are prone to have issues with sleeping, anger, alcohol abuse, and
loneliness (Adler, et al. 2011, Griffith 2019). These post-deployment attitudes can adversely
affect behaviors and mindsets that reach beyond questions pertaining to psychological conditions
and/or interpersonal relationships (Griffith 2019). Returning home from a deployment where
combat was experienced can also lead to feelings of survivor’s guilt and grief/regret (Faulkner
and McGaw 1977). Although the costs to combat experience seem relatively high, others have
found that there are reported benefits as well – e.g. participating in less risk-taking behavior
activities – (Adler, et al. 2011, Aldwin, Levenson and Spiro 1994).
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The second type of combat experience involves individuals who “participate in remote
combat and graphic media exploitation operations” (Ogle, Reichwald and Rutland 2018, 476).
Although this provides the benefit of removing the direct threat to life among service members,
there are still potential psychological risks associated with engaging with this type of combat
and/or the continued experience with combat trauma through reviewing photos/video/audio of
combat engagements (Ogle, Reichwald and Rutland 2018). Intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) personnel are the individuals who are most at risk of this type of combat
trauma (Langley 2012, Prince, et al. 2012, Prince, et al. 2015). This type of exposure also leads
to more emotional distress, burnout, problems socializing, and military job dissatisfaction
(Bryan, et al. 2018). ISR personnel are the ones who participate in “kill chain” operations and
often times are the ones who have continued exposure to combat trauma or terrorist propaganda
meant as deterrents for future opposition forces – including videos/pictures of torture,
executions, destroyed homes, enemies blown up/burned alive, and dead bodies or human remains
(Ogle, Reichwald and Rutland 2018). ISR personnel with more combat exposure are more likely
to say that they witnessed acts (and were troubled by incidents) that were morally wrong (Ogle,
Reichwald and Rutland 2018).
Regardless of the avenues by which service members experience combat, these
psychological experiences of combat trauma lead many combat veterans to experience
posttraumatic stress disorder (Pompili, et al. 2013, Ramchand, et al. 2015).
Military Combat Trauma Experience
One of the most prevalent issues with understanding the psychological traumas
associated with combat among military veterans is the stigma associated with help seeking (Britt,
et al. 2008, Mittal, et al. 2013). The type of combat trauma that veterans experience while
11

deployed is associated with whether they are willing to seek treatment (Paige, et al. 2019).
Military psychologists list six different categories of possible traumatic deployment experiences:
moral injury by self, moral injury by others, traumatic loss, life threat to self, life threat to others,
and aftermath of violence (Stein, et al. 2012, Paige, et al. 2019). Each of these categories are
measuring the exposure that service members may potentially face in combat. Additionally,
exposure to any one of these categories of trauma can be witnessed, experienced, or learned
about second-hand. The knowledge (even if told after-the-fact) that any one of these categories
have been met is enough to trigger the traumatic effects associated with each measure (Stein, et
al. 2012).
Moral injury (by self or others) consists of witnessing, committing, or nearly committing
a gross violation of moral or ethical standards that includes killings that are perceived as
unnecessary, including that of defenseless adversaries and/or civilians (Stein, et al. 2012, Paige,
et al. 2019). As the title of this type of trauma states, the acts can be either directly or indirectly
experienced in order for the trauma to take effect. Moral injury by self is strongly associated with
feelings occurring after traumatic episodes (known as “posttrauma”) including sentiments of
humiliation, guilt, and shame (Litz, et al. 2009). Additionally, moral injury (by self or others) is
commonly associated with severe PTSD symptoms. Moral injury by self reduces willingness to
seek treatment for PTSD (Steenkamp, et al. 2011). Moral injury by others is associated with
PTSD symptoms of re-experiencing the episode and social avoidance (Fontana, Rosenheck and
Brett 1992, Henning and Frueh 1997, Beckham, Feldman and Kirby 1998). Moral injury by
others is a strong predictor of state anger and feeling humiliated (Stein, et al. 2012). State anger
in this instance would mean that individuals are more likely to look to exact revenge after
experiencing traumatic instances that cause moral injury by others (Stein, et al. 2012). Moral
12

injury by self is a predictor of the TRGI conditions of Hindsight-Bias/Responsibility and
Wrongdoing (Stein, et al. 2012).
Traumatic loss consists of witnessing or learning of the loss of a fellow service member
or someone who is deemed “close” including those who are family, friends, or a fellow service
member (Stein, et al. 2012). Experiencing a traumatic loss during combat is one of the most
distressing types of deployment trauma (Nash and Litz 2013, Nash, et al. 2013, Pivar and Field
2004, Steenkamp, et al. 2011, Stein, et al. 2012). Most commonly, this type of combat trauma is
associated with feelings of grief and sadness (Pivar and Field 2004, Stein, et al. 2012). The
reactions most associated with this type of combat trauma during or shortly after trauma (known
as “peritrauma”) are anger and sadness (Stein, et al. 2012).
Life threat (to self or others) includes both actual and perceived threats to life of the
service member and/or to others (Stein, et al. 2012). Both forms of life threat are related to
feelings of anxiety and increased PTSD symptom severity (Pietrzak, et al. 2011, Sipos, et al.
2014, Vogt, et al. 2011). Life threat to self is associated with peritrauma feelings of feeling afraid
and being horrified, in addition to posttrauma feelings of feeling afraid and sad (Stein, et al.
2012). Life threat to others is associated with postrauma feelings of feeling numb (Stein, et al.
2012). Direct threat to life (either actual or perceived) is the most “culturally acceptable” type of
trauma to seek out mental health treatment (King, et al. 1995, Renshaw 2011). The stigma
surrounding seeking mental health assistance is lowest for this type of traumatic experience since
the individual is most at risk for death or catastrophic injury (Mittal, et al. 2013).
Lastly, the aftermath of violence is the personal account of experiencing the imagery,
smells, and/or sounds of death after a violent encounter (Stein, et al. 2012). This type of
traumatic experience is associated with the peritrauma reaction of horror and negatively affects
13

social functioning (Stein, et al. 2012). The personal nature of this type of trauma makes the
experience different for each individual who witnesses these types of trauma. Not every account
will be identical among observers. Moreover, it is this type of combat trauma that is most
commonly expressed through “flashbacks” in television and film (Talbott 1997). These
flashbacks (both on screen and in the minds of service members) are inherently personal to the
individual who suffered through the experience.
Functions of Guilt/Regret in Combat
As should be evident from the discussion above, guilt is often a byproduct of
experiencing combat among service members. Guilt is often connected to feelings of regret,
remorse, and repentance (Smith, et al. 2002). H.B. Lewis (1971) states that the experience of
guilt is different from feelings of shame due to the onus being placed on the act instead of the
individual. This produces feelings of remorse for the act that is conducted rather than the
function of shame, which makes the individual the central figure of feelings of regret. The
psychological functions of guilt come in two different forms: manifest and latent (Robertson and
McKee 1980). Manifest guilt is when actions are carried out deliberately and latent guilt is when
actions are performed unconsciously. Therefore, when it comes to guilt a service member may be
aware (manifest) or unaware (latent) of the effect of guilt. Specifically in regards to military
members, they have to be conditioned to shed themselves of feelings of guilt in order to conduct
actions deemed necessary as part of the military (Opp and Samson 1989, Grossman and
Christensen 2007). However, guilt is established retrospectively when service members have
time to reflect on the actions they experienced or witnessed (Opp and Samson 1989).
Guilt Associated with Combat Experience
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One of the feelings associated with combat is guilt that comes when a service member
witnesses combat trauma or other devastating effects associated with being in conflict with
adversaries. Opp and Samson (1989) discuss five different types of guilt in response to specific
combat scenarios. The five types of guilt include Survivor’s Guilt, Demonic Guilt,
Moral/Spiritual Guilt, Betrayal/Abandonment, and Superman/Superwomen Guilt.
Survivor’s Guilt is when a service member witnesses the death of someone who is close
to them (either by proximity or relationally). A common refrain is the service member feels relief
that they are not the ones who perished. This could potentially bring about guilt and regret that
they would have positive feelings about someone close to them dying (Grossman and
Christensen 2007). Alternatively, service members could potentially have the feeling that
someone else was killed (or died in some manner) so that they could live (Opp and Samson
1989). Ultimately, if a service member was in a position to “cheat” death, which resulted in the
death of someone in close proximity, this act can trigger feelings of Survivor’s Guilt (Williams
1987, Opp and Samson 1989). These feelings of guilt result in feelings of not being worthy to
live and an apprehension to succeed because they have an “indifference to living” (Opp and
Samson 1989, 160).
The second type of guilt is Demonic Guilt. This type of guilt is brought on by witnessing
or experiencing warfare. This is the very function that members of the military are trained to take
part in. This type of guilt can be heightened if the service member experiences some sort of joy
or power from engaging in “warfare or other aggressive acts” (Opp and Samson 1989, 160). In
addition, Demonic Guilt can also reveal itself in changes to the way that service members view
other people. Witnessing, observing, or participating in violence makes service members aware
of the “devil” that may lay dormant in other humans (Lifton 1973). This pessimistic or jaded
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change from combat experience can affect relationships due to the feeling of contaminating
others or becoming a “plague” of darkness (Opp and Samson 1989).
The third type of guilt is Moral/Spiritual Guilt. This type of guilt comes about when there
is a violation of “normal” human expectations on the sanctity of life. It brings about a type of
guilt that runs counter to any moral conditioning that individuals are taught as they are growing
up. Additionally, this type of guilt can be the combination of many types of norms that are
discarded through the service of one’s country. This can also lead to a disassociation with society
that can last for the entirety of the service member’s life because they acted counter to so many
moral norms that the individual does not think that they will be able to integrate themselves into
society because of what they have done. For those who are affiliated with religious groups,
killing can violate their religious beliefs and it can lead to beliefs that they are unable to be
forgiven and thus bound for hell or a negative afterlife experience (Opp and Samson 1989).
The fourth type of guilt is Betrayal/Abandonment Guilt. This is the guilt that a service
member feels due to the belief that they did not do enough to help/protect their fellow service
members while in combat. Much like previous types of guilt there is the feeling that service
members were unable to assist fellow military members to their full potential. In some ways,
service members feel the regret that they opted out of duties or responsibilities that led to the
death of others. One of the examples that Opp and Samson (1989) provide is the guilt that a
service member feels if they are not able to stay with their unit for the entirety of the
deployment.
Lastly, there is Superman/Superwoman guilt. As the name implies, some service
members may feel as though they have developed powers or abilities that allowed them to
survive. They feel that they are able to unconsciously know when they will get attacked or their
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senses are heightened to levels that could potentially save them. The guilt comes from service
members being unable to use these “abilities” to save others. Often times there is the thought that
if only the service member had used their abilities, they could have saved or prevented loss of
life to fellow service members (Opp and Samson 1989). These individuals generally held
positions of power while in the military and the feeling that the only ones who can understand
them are other veterans with similar experiences (Opp and Samson 1989). Ultimately, the service
member feels as though others did not have to endure the same levels of the deployment
experience and thus they are unable to understand these combat related complexities.
One of the prevailing beliefs among service members is that they let down their fellow
soldiers. Their personal actions were not able to overcome the loss of life of fellow service
members. Alternatively, a service member could also feel that their inactions led to the
preventable deaths of either fellow service members or civilians. Each of these experiences can
lead to negative feelings about oneself. Although most of the psychology literature shows how
the internalization of these events can lead to lower self-approval, attitudes about the service
members actions in the military from individuals other than the veteran may also negatively
affect the service members evaluation of their time in service. 2

2

To understand how attitudes about military veterans and combat veterans might vary, I
included some questions on the University of Mississippi’s team content as part of the 2018
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (Dowling 2018). I asked respondents what
characteristics or traits they would use to describe both categories of veteran. The details of the
study design are described in the Appendix. In brief, some respondents were asked to describe
“military veterans” and others to describe “combat veterans” in an open-ended response format.
For those receiving the “military veteran” condition, they were less likely than those in the
“combat veteran” condition to refer to veterans as “heroes.” I also find predictable differences
based on partisanship, where Republicans were more likely to say that either kind of veteran is
patriotic (or to emphasize nationalism in some way). This analysis provides some evidence that
perceptions of combat experience might matter for individuals other than military veterans. For
the full results see Appendix Tables A2.2, A2.3, and A2.4.
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In the next section I outline a new measurement of combat experience that accounts for
the traumatic effect of combat in service members who experience different types of combat
events.
Measuring Combat Experience
Exposure to combat comes in two primary forms. The first and most common way that
prior work has accounted for combat is by controlling for deployment to conflict zones
(Chatagnier and Klingler 2017, Horowitz and Stam 2014, Jennings and Markus 1977). This
measure accounts for the probability that a service member witnesses combat events, although
there is no way to fully comprehend if deployment alone is enough to result in exposure to
combat and/or the psychological trauma that accompanies combat exposure. The second type of
exposure to combat that accounts for combat experience is by controlling for encounters with
violent combat events. As Hoge et al. (2014) show, there are various types of combat that service
members may witness. Types of combat include close proximity to a firefight, which could
include mortar fire, gunfire, missiles, torpedoes, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The
distinction between the two types of combat experience is that the former captures the effect of
deployment, and not necessarily combat, whereas the latter captures that a service member
witnessed or experienced combat. By only controlling for deployment it precludes the researcher
from understanding the actual combat experience that a service member undergoes. Thus, it is
left to assumption that the service member experienced combat while deployed. In short, in order
to experience combat one must be deployed (except for instances involving military intelligence
and unmanned aerial vehicles), but simply being deployed does not mean that one will
experience combat.
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Previously, scholars have measured combat as a single, specific combat event (e.g.,
serving under fire, firing upon, or being fired upon by the enemy), which provides an instance of
threat that service members with this type of combat experience endure (Chatagnier and Klingler
2017, Cockerham and Cohen 1980, Brunk, Secrest and Tamashiro 1990). Using a single facet of
combat is an improvement upon prior work that equated deployment to “combat zones” to
combat experience. However, as Hoge et al. (2014) show, there are other events that service
members may encounter while deployed to combat zones that can better encapsulate combat.
In order to improve the measurement of combat experience, I build on previous political
science measures of combat experience by combining military psychology literature on how
trauma affects military personnel. I provide a more holistic approach to combat experience with
the inclusion of five different combat events that service members may encounter while
deployed. (Opp and Samson 1989, Hoge, et al. 2004, Stein, et al. 2012, Guyker, et al. 2013).
There are five combat events that I focus on: whether service members had (1) witnessed the
effects of improvised explosive devices (which might reflect experiencing Life Threat and/or
Aftermath of Violence), (2) engaged in gunfire exchanges while in foreign countries (Life
Threat), or witnessed the death of (3) enemy combatants (Life Threat and/or potentially Moral
Injury), (4) civilians (Moral Injury), or (5) fellow service members (Moral Injury and/or
Traumatic Loss). The use of the term “witnessed” is in line with the military psychology
literature, which argues that even if veterans have indirect experience with combat it is still likely
to cause psychological harm (Stein, et al. 2012).
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To measure combat experience and explore its effects on political behavior, I created an
original survey and distributed it through Qualtrics in March 2018. 3 Qualtrics’ quota-based
sampling allows for the recruitment of a sample of the U.S. population. 4 In this case, the sample
includes 1,000 civilians and an oversample of 200 veterans (16.7% of the total sample of 1,200)
that is intended to be representative of the U.S. population with respect to gender, race,
education, and income. According to U.S. Census data, veterans represent 7.3% of the U.S.
population.5 The Qualtrics sample therefore consists of more than two times as many veterans as
a typical nationally representative sample of the U.S. population. As shown in Table 2.1, most of
the military veterans in the sample are former active duty enlisted individuals spread across the
branches of the military. Out of the 200 veterans in this sample, 179 (89.5%) have been
discharged from service while 21 (10.5%) are currently either active or are in reserve units.
Appendix Table A2.1 displays descriptive characteristics for the Qualtrics sample overall, as
well as for veterans and civilians separately.

3

Human subjects approval was granted by the Institutional Review Board at the University of
Mississippi.
4
Qualtrics recruits participants through a number of ways including, but not limited to: Website
intercept recruitment, Member referrals, Targeted email lists, Gaming Sites, Customer loyalty
web portals, Permission-based networks, and Social Media. Participants are verified through a
double-opt-in process and agree to take part in surveys for an incentive. Participants are also
subject to other quality control measures such as LinkedIn matching, phone calls made to the
participant’s place of business, and other third-party verification methods. Using profile
information provided by the participants, Qualtrics sends them specific email invitations to
applicable surveys. If they elect to participate, panelists are informed and agree at the beginning
that they will only receive compensation upon completion of the survey.
5
See: https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk.
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Table 2.1. Military Branch Summary Statistics
Military
Branch
Air Force
Army
Coast Guard
Navy
Marines

Qualtrics
Sample %
19.5%
43.5%
2.0%
17.0%
10.5%

Actual
Branch %
24.0%
35.0%
3.0%
24.0%
14.0%

Note: The data is from the 2018 Qualtrics
sample, which is fairly representative of the
actual percentage of each branch’s makeup, according to 2018 data from the
Council of Foreign Relations
(https://www.cfr.org/article/demographicsus-military). The Qualtrics sample does not
sum to 100% because National Guard was
included in the sample, but was not
included in the actual branch percentages
from the Council of Foreign Relations.
Respondents could indicate that they experienced anywhere from zero to all five of the
combat scenarios detailed above. Table 2.2 shows the breakdown of respondents who
experienced each individual combat event. The results displayed range from 28.5% (death of a
civilian) to 44.0% (witnessing an IED or the death of a friendly). For analytical purposes,
respondents who indicated they experienced none of these events were scored 0 (42.5% of the
veteran sample), those who indicated they experienced all five were scored 5 (21.0%), and the
remaining veterans fell somewhere in between (1 [13.0%], 2 [6.5%], 3 [9.0%], or 4 [8.0%]
combat experiences). Higher values on the Combat Events variable equate to more instances of
combat that the respondent reported experiencing; lower values indicate that the respondent
reported experiencing fewer unique combat scenarios.
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Table 2.2. Military Combat Summary Statistics, Military Only
Variable (Did you witness a(n)…) %
N
Yes
IED?
44.0% 88
gunfire exchange with the enemy?
38.0% 76
death of a friendly?
44.0% 88
death of an enemy?
35.5% 71
death of a civilian?
28.5% 57
Note: The data is from the 2018 Qualtrics sample,
with the overall percentage and number of military
member respondents reporting they experienced each
of the instances of combat.
Factor analysis of the five items that comprise my Combat Events variable results in an
eigenvalue of 3.55 (and none of the items loaded on any other factor). The lowest factor loading
value for any of the items was 0.75 (for witnessing an IED). Additionally, I estimated a principle
components/correlation test and found that when the items load on the first factor they explain
71% of the variance. These analyses suggest that the items collectively measure a single latent
trait (Combat Events). Further, the military psychology literature suggests that the psychological
effects of these events of trauma may not be isolated effects. Often times it is witnessing multiple
events that can lead to the greatest effects of guilt and retrospect among veterans. Moreover,
since these are somewhat subjective measures (e.g., I cannot differentiate whether witnessing
gunfire exchange with the enemy was “worse” for some respondents more than others), I do not
wish to claim that any one of these traumatic episodes necessarily carries more psychologically
traumatic effects than any others. That is, I do not think the best approach is to a priori score
them by what I think is likely to have the biggest “psychological impact.” Therefore, I believe it
is best to keep these items together to measure the latent trait of Combat Events that service
members experience while in the military.
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In sum, measuring combat experience, as described above, allows me to quantify the
intended and unintended effects of witnessing multiple facets of military combat. Witnessing
these events amounts to violations to the psychological processes (e.g., Life Threat, Moral Injury
by Self, Moral Injury by Others, etc.), which may alter the political beliefs and behavior of
military combat veterans. Comprehending the effects of combat, as measured above, provides a
more nuanced understanding of the effects of combat on post-service political behaviors.
The Effects of Combat Trauma on Political Behavior
Combat exposure can elicit many different responses among service members.
Psychology research on combat trauma shows that there are multiple facets of mental processes
involved with experiencing combat and there are different functions of grief that alters how
individuals process these experiences. However, how these events of trauma affect political
behavior is a relatively understudied area of research. Those that study it tend to focus on how
traumatic acts can alter post-service behavior. This implies that when an individual experiences
events of trauma, their post-traumatic political behaviors will be altered by their time in the
military and the combat trauma they endured.
Many of the studies that have expressly studied political behavior have done so by using
Israeli forces and their opinions towards Palestinians (Canetti-Nisim, et al. 2009, Grossman,
Manekin and Miodownik 2015, Sundberg 2017). For example, Canetti-Nisim et al. (2009) find
that exposure to terrorism increases support for exclusionist political attitudes towards
minorities. The presumed mechanism behind this result is that individuals in the military spend
their time fighting against opposition forces and witness the depravity of war, which makes them
less likely to trust that the same minorities that they are facing are anything less than the evils
they have encountered in battle. Additionally, in Israel, combat experience increases support for
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hardliner parties and a reluctance for changes in political policies (Grossman, Manekin and
Miodownik 2015). However, the way that Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownick (2015) measure
combat is by measuring time spent (more than 12 months) in a combat role. The assumption is
that individuals serving in a combat role are subjected to the effects of combat, however that may
not always be the case (Chatagnier and Klingler 2017). Alternatively, for service members who
have reported experiencing more combat, they were less inclined to change their views on
violence, which provides some evidence that combat experience does not trigger change, but
may act as a buffer to supporting increased violence (Sundberg 2017).
In the ensuing chapters, I theorize about specific effects combat experience may have on
political attitudes and behavior.
Summary
Understanding the psychological effects of combat on military veterans is important to
those studying the political behavior of military veterans. There are serious conditions that arise
from the psychological trauma of experiencing combat. Even though experiencing combat is a
potential expectation (although not necessarily the norm) for service members, actually
witnessing the effects of combat has untold negative consequences for them during and after they
leave the military. This can involve attitudes about their own self-worth, attitudes/reactions to
family members, and I argue their political behavior.
The way that social scientists measure combat experience can be refined. Measuring it as
a dichotomous experience conceals the nuance that different combat experiences has on service
members and their political behavior and attitudes. While deployment has been shown to matter
for specific political attitudes and behavior, substituting deployment for combat experience is
fraught with internal validity concerns. In addition, by assuming that one individual instance of
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combat experience has a more substantive effect than any other is problematic for measurement
and explanatory reasons. Although the measurements reported have the potential to be refined
with future examinations of questions revolving around intensity and proximity to combat
events, they do provide a more stable foundation to analyze the effects of military combat trauma
on service members.
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CHAPTER 3: VETERAN SOCIAL IDENTITY, PARTISANSHIP, AND POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR
Social identities are a key feature of American politics. Partisan identity is perhaps the
most important predictor of political behavior (e.g., Campbell, et al. 1960, Green, Palmquist and
Schickler 2004), but there are instances when another social identity may reinforce expected
partisan behavior (Lee 2008). In addition, there may be times (or particular issues) when an
identity, such as gender identity, does not align with expectations based on partisan identity
alone (Klar 2018). One such social identity that has remained largely unexplored in political
science is the extent to which someone identifies with the U.S. military, in particular as a veteran
(or, with veterans).
Like other professions (e.g., Canrinus, et al. 2011, Goldie 2012, Willetts and Clarke
2014), military members are routinely reminded of their sense of professional identification, or
with the “veteran” group, through the uniforms they wear, habits they learn through service, or
being isolated in foreign lands with only fellow military members in close proximity. Not all
veterans share the same experiences, however, and therefore all might not be equally attached to
a “veteran” identity. Deployments to conflict zones, even though they place service members in
harm’s way, may provide for different experiences among members stationed overseas.
Additionally, not all deployments result in the same type of conflict experience for those who are
stationed in those areas (Chatagnier and Klingler 2017). Therefore, there may be certain
activities that service members perform, or engage in, while in combat scenarios that change the
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way that the veteran views their time in the military. For example, most service members must
go through similar combat training, but not every member of the military experiences combat.
What does it mean to be a “veteran” then, and how do the actions during a service
member’s time in the armed forces condition how they view their service and subsequent sense
of identity as a veteran? Previous research shows that military experience is associated with
increased political participation (Teigen 2006) and that the percentage of veterans who identify
as partisans is similar to the general population percentage who do so (Teigen 2007). However,
we do not know whether a service member’s time in the military influences the way they come
to view their identity as a veteran. Additionally, we do not know whether “veteran” identity
extends beyond military members to their family members as well and whether that identity
influences political opinions, even after controlling for partisanship.
Relying on an original data source and data from the American National Election Studies
(ANES), this chapter makes three contributions to research on veteran’s political behavior. First,
based on social identity theory and previous work on the social identity of other professions, I
theorize and find evidence that there is a veteran identity that military members associate
themselves with. Military veterans are more likely to associate with the veteran identity than are
civilians with no prior military service (and no military family relation). However, non-military
civilians that have military family members identify closer to the veteran social identity group
than do civilians without military familial relationships. In addition, there are specific service
related experiences (combat experiences and valuing time spent in the military) that lead to a
stronger attachment to the veteran group. Second, for most veterans, there is a greater sense of
attachment to the veteran identity than to their partisan identity. Third, I compare the effects of
veteran identity and partisan identity on the issue of domestic spending for military purposes and
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find that veteran identity informs opinions on this issue, with an effect that is comparable to that
of partisan identity.
Taken together, these contributions suggest greater attention should be paid to the social
identity of military members (and their families) as “veterans.” In particular, this has
implications for their political behavior, especially as there has been an increase in the numbers
of veterans, especially women, running for office in recent years (Schroeder, Best and Teigen
2019). Studying the social identity of veterans therefore has implications for both public and elite
political behavior.

Social Identity and Military Service
Social identity theory stipulates that individuals attach themselves to a group and they
self-identify with other in-group members (Billig and Tajfel 1973, Tajfel 1978, Tajfel and Turner
1979, Tajfel 1981). This theory relies on an in-group and out-group mindset that allows
individuals to make a distinction between themselves and individuals who share similar traits.
These groups can be existing, or they can be created through applying characteristics to others,
regardless of the knowledge of placement from those identified. Based on social identity theory,
the categorization of individuals into groups is subjective, and it relies on the individual being
able to identify different characteristics that are vital to group membership and to articulate those
differences internally (Turner 1982). Additionally, there is not a single identity that comprises
the totality of an individual’s social identity. Instead, a social identity is the accumulation of
identities that individuals use to define themselves (Turner 1982). This type of awareness of
one’s place in a group and the psychological group attachment surrounding that membership is
what composes social identity (Tajfel 1981). In sum, even though individuals may have different
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identities that comprise their sense of self, how an individual views themselves is the sum total
of those identities.
Social identity theory has been applied to many fields and professions (GonzálesFigueroa and Young 2005). Ely (1994) found that women in professional settings were more
likely to feel empowered by their gender identity when there were more women in leadership
roles as compared to women in professional settings where women were not common in
leadership roles. In the field of medicine, Goldie (2012) finds that the identity of medical
students is constructed through formal and informal relations, experiences, and expectations in
their professional field. Willetts and Clarke (2014) find that the social identity of nurses has
multiple facets, from their identity in training to the identity that they acquire being on the floor
caring for patients. Finally, the social identity of teachers varies based on their job satisfaction,
motivation, and experiences (Canrinus, et al. 2011). In short, prior scholarship shows that
individual professions often have a shared identity. Moreover, this shared identity affects how
professionals view themselves and how training strengthens that identity (Willetts and Clarke
2014). Thus, it stands to reason that military personnel would also have similar foundational
pieces for a comparable shared social identity. Further, as is the case with other professions,
there may be certain activities or experiences that shape or strengthen this “veteran” identity.

Veterans
Veterans are a group that both place themselves into categories and have others place
them into categories. One relevant factor concerns the make-up of individuals who decide to join
the military. The two major theoretical bases for this line of thought are self-selection and
socialization. Self-selection of military members into service is when individuals join the armed
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forces due to some drive that brings some to enlist while others opt not to join (Bachman,
Sigelman and Diamond 1987, Cockerman 1978, Dorman 1976, Jennings and Markus 1977, E.
M. Schreiber 1979). Ultimately, the United States military is not working with blank slates when
individuals enlist to serve in the military (Jennings and Markus 1977). The factors that condition
them to join will alter how they behave and react while in the service. The second line of
reasoning is the socialization that occurs once an individual joins the armed forces (Shay 1994).
While there will be a baseline socialization effect that occurs for each member of the military,
the level of involvement on the part of the service member dictates the level of socialization that
occurs. For those military members who rarely (if at all) experience combat scenarios and
perform other, similar functions of a military member (e.g., go on deployments and/or deploy to
combat zones), their experiences and socialization will be quite different from the experiences of
a service member who is frequently deployed to combat zones.
The experiences that military members endure are somewhat random as whether and
where an individual is deployed is not in the hands of the military member. A conflict could
break out in a foreign country and the needs of the military could dictate that a member is sent as
a first line of defense to protect the interests of the United States. In addition, military members
experience combat to different degrees. These different combat experiences could be in the form
of engaging in gunfire exchanges with the opposition, witnessing the deaths of fellow service
members, the adversary, and/or civilians, and being physically hurt in the line of duty (Endicott,
2020). Almost all military members train to protect and defend the interests of the United States
in the event of deployment. Regardless of the veteran’s activities during their enlistment (a point
I return to in the results section), being a member of the military familiarizes military members
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to, and is likely to make them feel a part of, this group. I therefore expect military veterans to
have a stronger sense of attachment to a “veteran” identity than civilians.

Military Family Members
Strong familial ties to the military are prevalent among relatives of military members.
“Pentagon data show that 80% of recent troops come from a family where at least one parent,
grandparent, aunt or uncle, sibling or cousin has also worn their nation’s uniform” (Thompson
2016). Relatives of service members are constantly engaged with the military lifestyle when they
live on bases with the family member(s) who is (are) serving. The customs and practices of
military life are then passed to the close relatives of service members. In addition, when a
military member deploys to a location overseas it is often the other on-base military family
members that are relied upon (Albano 1994). Similarly, on-base assistance groups provide
support for family members during a deployment. This sense of community grows due to the
special circumstances that surround a deployment and the military lifestyle. With such high
numbers of military members having familial ties to the military, this leads to an indoctrination
long before an individual is able to join the military.
Living abroad or living on base, nuclear family members (parents, siblings, spouses, and
children) are experiencing the military lifestyle daily. That type of experience can shape the way
that individuals view the military and their own perception of how they self-identify in
comparison to other social identity groups. Nuclear family members include parents, siblings,
spouses, and children. Having this immediate type of connection with the military experience
may have lasting effects on an individuals’ self-perception going forward. I therefore expect
military family members (especially those with a closer familial connection – i.e., nuclear family
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members) to exhibit stronger ties to a “veteran” identity than civilians without military family
members.

Research Design and Data
To study the social identity of veterans and their family members, I make use of multiple
data sources. First, I utilize my original survey from Qualtrics, as discussed in Chapter 2. Two
items are used to measure my outcome of interest, identity as a veteran. The first, Veteran Social
ID, is from a question that was asked only of military respondents: “To what extent do you think
of yourself as being a veteran?” (response options: “a great deal,” “somewhat,” “very little,” or
“not at all”). The second, Closeness to Veterans, is an item from a battery of questions that asked
all respondents how close they feel toward certain groups. This item allows for a comparison
across more respondents as each respondent was able to provide a response to the following
question: “How close do you feel towards the following groups? By ‘close’ we mean people who
are most like you in their ideas, interests, and feelings” (response options: “very closely,”
“closely,” “somewhat closely,” “not closely at all”). One of the groups that was asked about was
“veterans.” Both Veteran Social ID and Closeness to Veterans are rescaled 0-1, with higher
scores indicating a greater sense of identity as/closeness to veterans.
On my original survey fielded through Qualtrics, I also asked respondents to rate how
“warm” or “cold” they felt to the “U.S. Military” on a standard feeling thermometer question.
Although the feeling thermometer item is likely not as valid a measure of identity as the other
items (Abdelal, et al. 2009), it does allow me to compare my study with respondents from the
2012 ANES, which has a larger sample of veterans and civilians and asked the same feeling
thermometer item about the military. Thus, although the 2012 ANES does not have the military
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specific variables I use in some analyses below, I am able to show how military veterans
compare to civilians in relation to their military group feeling thermometer ratings. 6
My primary independent variable (military) is a dichotomous measure in which
respondents are coded one (1) if they have served in the military and zero (0) if they have not.
Specifically, this variable will allow me to test the strength of veteran identity for veterans
compared to civilians. I also include an indicator for respondents who had a close relative who
was a member of the military (nuclear family; parents, spouses, children, and siblings of military
members are 1 and all other relations, or no relation, are 0). I include a separate indicator for
respondents who had an extended family member that served in the military (extended family;
grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins are 1 and all other relations and those who did not have
a relation who served are 0). My analyses also include additional variables as controls. I control
for gender (male; dichotomous variable where 1 if male and 0 if female), race/ethnicity (white;
dichotomous variable where 1 is white and 0 is non-white), age (age; standardized variable
ranging from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating older respondents), and education (education;
standardized variable ranging from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating more education). Finally,
I control for respondent partisanship with dichotomous indicators for Republicans (republican)
and Democrats (democrat), with Independents serving as the omitted, reference category. 7

6

The 2012 ANES sample summary statistics can be found in Appendix Table A3.1. The 2012
ANES was the last National Elections Survey that included questions regarding the feeling
thermometers for the Democratic Party, Republican Party, and the United States Military.
Additionally, it also included almost twice as many military veteran respondents (N=775;
13.11% of the ANES sample) as the population at large (7.5%), as well as questions concerning
cutting military spending.
7
Respondents who identified as Democrats (Republicans) including those who subsequently
identified themselves as “strong” or “weak” are coded as 1 for democrat (republican). Partisan
“leaners” (those respondents who initially identified as Independent but subsequently stated they
felt closer to the Democratic or Republican Party) are included with Independents.
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Results
I estimated a series of OLS regressions to test the effect of military status on veterans’
social identity. In this analysis, I use the dependent variables that both military members and
civilians received. I expect military veterans and (to a lesser extent) military family members to
identify as feeling “closer” to the military and have “warmer” feelings towards the military than
do civilians. Results for this analysis, with various model specifications, are displayed in
Appendix Table A3.2.8 Figure 3.1 displays the results from Model 3, in which all variables are
included in the analysis of the Qualtrics data.

8

The first four models use the Closeness to Veterans dependent variable measure and the final
five models use the feeling thermometer ratings of the military dependent variable. Models 8 and
9 provide a comparison of the Qualtrics study with respondents from the 2012 ANES. Additional
analysis conducted with ordered logit instead of OLS for the Closeness to Veterans dependent
variable appears in Appendix Table A3.3. That analysis yields similar statistical and substantive
results to the OLS models presented in the first four columns of Appendix Table A3.2.
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The results show support for previous research that has identified a link between identification
with the Republican Party and military service (Klingler and Chatagnier 2014, Cormack 2018).
Additionally, individuals who have more years of education are less likely to feel “close” to
veterans, as are respondents who are white. Of central focus here, however, being a member of
the military has a large (22%, p<0.001) effect on feeling “close” to veterans. Additionally, being
a nuclear (9%, p<0.001) or extended (8%, p=0.004) military family member is also positively
associated with a feeling of closeness to veterans. This analysis shows that, as theory would
expect, military veterans are more likely to identify and feel “close” to the veteran social identity
group than do civilians with no military experience. Moreover, having a close military familial
connection also produces feelings of more closeness to the veteran social group.
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Models 5-9 in Table A3.2 use the feeling thermometer assessments of the military. The
primary specifications of interest are Models 8 (Qualtrics study) and 9 (2012 ANES), which are
displayed in Figure 3.2 as hollow circles and black circles, respectively. Although some of the
control variables vary in their statistical significance across samples, in both studies military
veterans have statistically significantly “warmer” feelings toward the military than do civilians. 9
Even though the feeling thermometer is not a direct test of feelings toward a veteran
identity, the analysis presented in Figure 3.2 provides support for the assessment that military
individuals feel stronger towards the military, and likely their military identity. Moreover, it
suggests that although my Qualtrics study has fewer military members than other samples such
as the ANES, I obtain similar results on the key variable of interest (military). This is important
9

For example, Republican respondents from the 2012 ANES do not have as warm of feelings
towards the military as compared to those in the Qualtrics study. This could be an artifact of the
time at which the studies took place and who the commander in chief was at the time, President
Obama in 2012 and President Trump in 2018.
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as the next analysis relies only on the Qualtrics study because I was able to ask more specific
questions of military members.

Military Experience Matters for Veteran Identity
As mentioned previously, veterans do not share the same experiences during their time in
the military. In particular, military members experience combat in different ways and to different
degrees. These different combat experiences could be in the form of engaging in gunfire
exchanges with the opposition, witnessing the deaths of fellow service members, the adversary,
and/or civilians (Hoge, et al. 2004). Enduring effects of combat experience have lasting
impressions on the service members (Grossman and Christensen 2007, Kennedy and Zillmer
2012, Stein, et al. 2012). Generally, if the trauma that a service member experiences is enough to
violate the psychological processes of traumatic events, then these events will ultimately stay
with the service member longer. Those memories of combat and trauma experienced can serve as
a reminder that they served and keep their service in their subconscious for longer.
To test whether combat, and other military experiences, influence the way in which
military members have a “veteran identity,” I asked specific questions of my Qualtrics sample.
For example, to measure unique combat event experience (combat events), I utilized my combat
variable as laid out in Chapter 2, which asked about specific instances of combat that
respondents had experienced from a total of five scenarios. This included questions regarding
whether the respondent had (1) witnessed the effects of improvised explosive devices, witnessed
the death of (2) enemy combatants, (3) civilians, or (4) fellow service members, and (5) engaged
in gunfire exchanges while in foreign countries. Respondents could indicate that they
experienced anywhere from zero to all five of these combat scenarios. Higher values on the
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combat variable (rescaled to range from 0-1) equate to more instances of combat that the
respondent reported experiencing.
Other experiences may also shape the way that veterans look back on their time in service
and how they identify as a veteran. This could include how or why military members join the
Armed Forces (volunteer; dichotomous variable where 1 is volunteered and 0 is drafted). If
individuals are voluntarily self-selecting into military service then their views about the military
should be different from those who were drafted or strongly encouraged by others to join (i.e.,
“voluntold”). It is also equally as important to understand how a veteran leaves the military
(honorable: a dichotomous variable where honorable discharge is 1 and other-than-honorable,
dishonorable, and active duty is 0). For those who are discharged from the military with a
designation that is not Honorable, the assumption is that something occurred during their time in
service that means they are parting on at least somewhat unpleasant terms. Another aspect of
how a military veteran views their veteran identity may be whether or not they “valued” their
time in the military (value time in military: this is a four-category variable with higher numbers
indicating that the respondent strongly agreed with the assessment of valuing their time in the
military). Veterans who had positive experiences with their military service are more likely to
have positive feelings associated with a veteran identity. Last, if a service member is still in the
military that might alter their perceptions on identifying as a veteran – because “veteran” is
generally used to refer to members who have already separated from the military (active; where
active duty and reserve members are 1 and military members who have been discharged from
service are 0).
The effect of each of these military experiences on veteran identity is displayed in Figure
3.3. Because military members were asked all three items described above (Veteran’s Social ID
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(hollow circles), “Close” to Veterans (black circles), and Feeling Thermometer: Military (plus
sign), Figure 3.3 displays the effects of each military experience for all three outcomes of interest
(see Table A3.3 for full regression results). The results indicate that having more combat event
experiences increases a veteran’s sense of self-identifying as a veteran across the two main
measures of veteran identity, but is not associated with an increase in “warmer” feelings towards
the military. In other words, among individuals who have served in the military, those who have
more unique combat event experiences are more likely than those without combat experiences to
identify as “close” to the veteran social identity group. Two additional military experience
variables that are positive and statistically significantly associated with identifying as a veteran
(Veteran’s Social ID) are veterans with an honorable discharge (p=0.035) and veterans who
valued their time in the military (p<0.001). Veterans who valued their time in the military also
identified as feeling “closer” to veterans (p=0.027) and “warmer” to the military (p=0.01). There
is no statistically significant difference in identification with or feelings toward veterans among
veterans who volunteered and those who were drafted, however this may be due to the fact that
there are only 36 respondents in my sample who were drafted. Finally, whether a military
member is currently active duty or no longer active duty is not statistically significantly
associated with the measures of “veteran” identity. As is the case with those who were
volunteered versus drafted, it should be noted that there are only 21 activity duty personnel in my
sample.
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Veteran Identity and Partisan Identity
The preceding analyses suggest that there is a “veteran identity” that military members are
more likely to identify with than civilians, and that certain members of the military (in particular,
those who experienced more combat events and those who report valuing their time in the
military more) are also more likely to identify with. I now turn to what this identity means for
political opinions, especially in relation to another powerful social identity, partisanship. I begin
by examining three group feeling thermometer ratings (the military, Republicans, and
Democrats) in relation to respondent self-assessments of their party identification. 10 I am
interested in how veterans and civilians view the military in relation to the party with which they

10

Although feeling thermometer ratings may not provide as direct a test for how closely a
respondent identifies with a given group compared to other measures of closeness, the feeling
thermometers are the only measures of identity I have that are similar for both identity with
veterans and identity with the political parties. Further, as Greene (1999, 2004) shows, feeling
thermometers can provide an acceptable measure of a respondent’s social (partisan) identity.
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self-identify. I posit that, compared to civilians, veterans—because of their stronger sense of
social identity with the “veteran” group—will have warmer feelings towards the military than
they do the party with which they identify.
In order to test this, for each respondent I took the feeling thermometer rating of the
military and subtracted the feeling thermometer rating of each respondent’s in-party (i.e., the
party they self-identify with). This is done separately for veterans and civilians, and for five
partisan groupings: strong Republicans, weak Republicans, Independents, weak Democrats, and
strong Democrats.11 For example, a veteran who is also a strong Republican who rated the
military at 85 and the Republican Party at 75 would have a score of 10 (85-75), suggesting that
they have somewhat warmer feelings toward the military than their in-party.
The average difference in ratings by partisan group is displayed separately for veterans
and civilians in Table 3.1, where positive numbers indicate warmer feelings toward the military
than the in-party. Panel A of Table 3.1 provides the results for the Qualtrics study respondents.
Panel B provides the same estimates for 2012 ANES respondents. As an example, as shown in
Panel A, the feeling thermometer of the military minus the feeling thermometer for Republicans
among strong Republican veterans is 11.05. The feeling thermometer of the military minus the
feeling thermometer of Republicans for strong Republican civilians is 4.92. When the two
differences are subtracted from each other there is a difference of 6.13, which is statistically

11

If respondents indicated they identified with either the Republican or Democratic Party and
subsequently selected that they are “strong” Republicans/Democrats, they are in the “Strong”
category. If they identified as “not very strong” Republicans/Democrats or as an Independent but
felt closer to the Republican/Democratic Party then they are placed in the “Weak” category (i.e.,
partisan “leaners” are in the “Weak” group). Appendix Tables A3.5 and A3.6 contains all
partisan categories including Independents.
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significant (p=0.062) and suggests strong Republican veterans report more positive feelings
toward the military than they do their in-party. 12

Party

Table 3.1. Difference in Feeling Thermometer Ratings (Military minus In-Party)
Panel A. Qualtrics
Strong Republican
Weak Republican
Weak Democrat
Strong Democrat

Veterans
11.05
24.33
17.73
-8.79

N
55
43
33
38

Civilians
4.92
13.97
-1.08
-17.63

N
131
186
228
233

Difference
6.13*
10.35**
18.81***
8.84*

Veterans
12.91
28.90
16.66
17.53

N
124
194
179
224

Civilians
11.11
23.09
9.99
7.30

N
586
943
1,315
1,844

Difference
1.80
5.81***
6.67***
10.23***

Party

Panel B. 2012 ANES
Strong Republican
Weak Republican
Weak Democrat
Strong Democrat

Note: Results presented are for feeling thermometer ratings for the military minus feeling
thermometer ratings for respondent in-party. Values are percentage differences for each group
(veterans and civilians) by stated partisan identity. Full results (including for independents) can be
found in Appendix Tables A3.5 (Qualtrics) and A3.6 (2012 ANES) for feelings toward Republicans
(Panel A) and Democrats (Panel B). Reported p-values are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.

There are three key takeaways from Table 3.1. First, with one exception (strong
Democrats in the Qualtrics sample), on average veterans hold warmer feelings towards the
military than their in party (i.e., seven of the eight values in the “veterans” column are positive).
The magnitude of these differences ranges from 11 to 29 points, suggesting veterans have
substantially warmer feeling toward their veteran group than they do their partisan group.
Second, with only two exceptions (strong and weak Democrats in the Qualtrics sample), on
average civilians also hold warmer feelings towards the military than their in party. This suggests

12

To test for statistical significance, I estimated a series of OLS regressions separately for each
partisan group in which the difference score (i.e., feeling thermometer military minus feeling
thermometer in-party) was regressed on an indicator for whether the respondent was a military
member (1) or civilian (0).
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that part of the greater warmth veterans feel toward the military can be explained by more
positive feelings individuals feel toward the military than they do political parties. However, it is
the case that the difference between ratings of the military and the in-party is smaller for civilians
in each case, which leads to the third takeaway: Veterans hold statistically significantly warmer
feelings towards the military than their in-party in comparison to civilians in all cases, except for
2012 ANES strong Republicans (the 1.80 difference is still in the expected direction, p=.356).
Even among strong Democrats in the Qualtrics sample, where both veterans and civilians report
warmer feelings toward their in-party, the gap between the two is not as large for military
veterans. In short, Table 3.1 provides support for my theorized expectation that veterans are
more likely to hold stronger feelings towards the military than the party with which they identify,
even in comparison to civilians.
Overall, the preceding analysis shows that veterans are more likely to identify with the
“veteran” group (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2) and certain aspects of military service are associated
with veterans being more likely to identify as a veteran (see Figure 3.3). In addition, in a
comparison of feelings towards the military and their partisan identity, veterans are more likely
to have warmer feelings towards the military than their partisan identity (see Table 3.1). Next, I
consider the effect of veteran and partisan identity on specific policy positions.

Veteran Identity, Partisan Identity, and Policy Attitudes Concerning Defense Spending
In this section, I provide an initial test of the extent to which identifying as a veteran
matters in the realm of domestic policy concerning defense spending. One area that military
veterans may differ from their civilian co-partisans is in regards to defense spending. Prior work
shows that the level of defense spending fluctuates based on current military threat (Abolfathi
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1980, Cappella Zielinski, Fordham and Schilde 2017). However, an individual who identifies
with the veteran group could have a different viewpoint on how governmental spending may
affect current military members who soon will be a part of their veteran group. In this instance,
being a military veteran could lead to divergence in thought from co-partisans.
To test this assumption, I asked respondents their opinions on if they thought “the total
amount the U.S. is spending on defense and military purposes should be: increased, kept at
present levels, or decreased/ended all together.” Responses to this item, which was rescaled to
range from 0-1, were coded so that higher values reflect the belief that military spending should
decrease or end all together. The two main independent variables used to measure strength of
veteran identity are the “Close” to Veterans and Veteran Social Identity variables discussed
above. I also include the same set of control variables used in earlier analyses (republican and
democrat, white, age, education, and male. The results, based on the Qualtrics sample, can be
found in Figure 3.4 (see Appendix Table A3.7 for full regression output).
Figure 3.4 reports results for the main independent variables of interest and the
partisanship indicators from regression analysis for the entire sample [Panel A], among civilians
only [Panel B], and among military members only [Panels C and D]. The “Close” to Veterans
variable, which equates to higher scores meaning feeling closer to the veteran group, is the main
independent variable in Panels A, B, and C. Panel D contains the Veteran Social Identity variable
that was only asked of military members. The results are similar across panels. The results
indicate that individuals who identify as close to veterans (while controlling for the effect of
partisan identity) are less likely to support cutting military spending. In addition, for military
members (Panels C and D) both variables measuring veteran identity result in similar negative
associations with beliefs about decreasing military spending.
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The analysis in Figure 3.4 provides support for the expectation that the more someone
identifies as close to veterans the less likely they are to support decreasing military expenditures,
even when accounting for partisanship. In fact, the effect of identifying as close to veterans is
comparable to the effect of partisanship. Moving across the full range (from 0-1) of the veteran
social identity measure results in anywhere from a 16 (Panel A) to 25 (Panel C) percentage point
shift in support, which is in line with the effect of being a Republican (13-15 percentage points)
and somewhat larger than the effect of being a Democrat (6-11 percentage points). In short, the
evidence is consistent with the interpretation that identifying with veterans has an independent
effect on opinions on the issue of defense spending.13

13

In additional analysis, I interacted the partisan indicators with the measures of closeness to
veterans and found no substantively or statistically significant interactive effects for the entire
sample or separately among civilians and veterans (see Appendix Table A3.8).
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Discussion
The role of social identity in political behavior is well documented. This paper adds to
our understanding of social identity and political behavior with respect to military veterans in
three ways. First, this paper shows that for members of the military who have left the service,
there exists a social identity to which veterans report belonging (Figure 3.1). Additionally, while
members of the military are more likely to identify as a veteran, I also find that civilians with
nuclear familial connections are more likely to identify as close to veterans (Figure 3.1).
Although these feelings of family members pale in comparison to members of the military, it is
still important for scholars to consider when researching feelings towards veterans or the military
in general, there may be many more individuals who feel connected to the Armed Forces than
those who don a military uniform. In an additional test of these results, I observe similar findings
of feelings towards the military from the 2012 ANES (Figure 3.2).
Second, although a comparison of civilians and military veterans shows a stronger sense
of identity for veterans, there are certain military experiences that strengthen a military
individual’s sense of identity as a veteran (Figure 3.3). This includes military veterans who had
more unique combat event experiences and those who valued their time in the military.
Therefore, treating military members as a homogenous group may be problematic as there are
certain experiences that can strengthen feelings associated with their veteran group identification.
Third, when the strength of a veteran identity is compared to partisan identity, veterans
tend to have more favorable feelings toward the military than do co-partisan civilians (Table
3.1). Further, veteran identity also had an effect on domestic policy preferences. Specifically,
when I examine opinions on military spending among veterans and civilians, I find that the more
someone identifies with veterans (Democrats and Republicans alike) the less likely they are to
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support decreasing military spending (Figure 3.4). Even though the effect of veteran identity is
present for veterans and civilians, it is strongest (and partisanship is the weakest) among
members of the military (Panel D of Figure 3.4).
Together, the results presented in this paper suggest that there is a veteran identity that
military members and civilians attach themselves to and this identification as a veteran is
associated with certain policy positions. Additionally, these findings point to a public who may
be willing to cross partisan lines in order to support issues involving the military. Although the
aim of this study is not centered on political elites with veteran backgrounds, the results do
suggest that veteran identity can be extended to a large section of the population who have
family members who do or have served in the military. This broadens the scope of a veteran
identity to include more constituents who may diverge from their party in relation to militaryspecific issues. Therefore, there may be more constituents for political elites to listen to on issues
involving the military, even those who may not be tracked by the Veterans Administration. 14
This line of inquiry can be extended in future research while overcoming some of the
limitations of this study in a number of ways, three of which I highlight here. First, future work
should consider whether veteran identity is associated with other domestic issues. There will
likely be some domestic issues that the veteran social identity does not influence, but that should
not negate the association it has with other issues, including other issues related to the military
not examined in this paper.
Second, having more veterans from diverse deployment cohorts would also build on the
present findings by being able to analyze how different cohorts view their veteran identity. For

14

Including the number of veterans listed by state or congressional district (see
https://www.va.gov/vetdata/veteran_population.asp).
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example, how the public treated military veterans who were returning from Vietnam and how
those interactions may reinforce (or dissuade) identification as a “veteran.” The present study
cannot speak to specific cohort differences outside of controlling for age, which is not a direct
measure of deployment cohorts. There may be specific aspects about each cohort and the
reception of citizens back home to their conflict efforts that may provide further understanding of
how a sense of identification as a veteran is established.
Third, a longitudinal study could uncover changes in identifying as a veteran among
individuals prior to service until after they have left the military. This would show how the effect
of service shapes these identities. It may be that individuals are joining who already feel close to
veterans, or have some stronger sense of veteran identification. Utilizing a longitudinal study can
document changes to veteran identity over time. That said, the fact that I find variation in veteran
identity is associated with various events and circumstances of the service member’s time in the
Armed Forces suggests that identification with the military is at the very least not entirely driven
by self-selection.
Military veterans are a group that is lauded for their sacrifices for their country. As a
group, they are more likely to turnout to vote (Leal and Teigen 2018). Additionally, they are
consistently utilizing their military identity when they run for office (Teigen 2013, Hardy, et al.
2019). Recognizing how their social identity as a veteran influences their political behavior is
therefore an important endeavor for gaining a greater understanding of their role within the
political process.
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CHAPTER 4: COMBAT EXPERIENCE AND THE FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS OF
VETERANS
Although there is reason to believe that the public is able to comprehend the events that
unfold globally (Holsti, 1992; Shapiro and Page, 1988) or may inadvertently become aware of
foreign policy (Baum, 2002), the average citizen tends not to have the time, nor inclination, to
stay committed to the affairs of foreign countries and the ways in which the United States
engages with the international community. One group of citizens that has reason to be more
aware of global affairs, however, is the military. Members of the military must stay engaged with
global affairs because they may soon be stationed overseas and asked to follow through on the
United States’ foreign policy commitments. Not only do Service members often have first-hand
experience with implementing foreign policy, but they also return with the lasting effects that
engaging in combat has on individuals (Grossman and Christensen, 2007). Although combat may
not alter their opinions on war overall (Sundberg, 2017), prior work suggests there is reason to
believe that combat – and the adverse effects of involvement in combat – may alter soldier’s
opinions on military engagement (Grote, Frieze, and Schmidt, 1997; Feaver and Gelpi, 2005;
Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik, 2015).
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between combat experience and the foreign
policy positions of U.S. military veterans. I argue that individuals who enlist in the Military
Services may have their foreign policy outlooks altered by the effects that combat has on them. It
is well known that the death and destruction that Service members experience in service to one’s
country have lasting psychological effects (Bourke, 2000; Gorman, Blow, Ames, and Reed,
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2011; Grossman and Christensen, 2007; Jones, 2006; Kennedy and Zillmer, 2012; Lund,
Foy, Sipprelle, and Strachan, 1984; Calvert and Hutchinson, 1990). Building from this prior
work, I hypothesize that the more unique combat experiences that a veteran endured in the line
of duty, the less likely they are to support more “hawkish” foreign policies, especially if the
veteran expresses regret about their service time.
More specifically, this chapter makes two contributions to research on the opinions of
veterans. First, I compare veterans who report experiencing combat both to veterans who do not
report experiencing combat and to civilians. This permits me to show both how the foreign
policy positions of veterans with and without combat experience differ from civilians, as well as
how veterans with and without combat experience differ from one another.
The second contribution is conceptual and empirical. I build on prior research that
examines the effects of combat on veterans’ foreign policy opinions by using my new measure of
combat experience. Specifically, I distinguish between “any combat” experience and having a
greater number of unique combat experiences, under the assumption that having a greater
number of unique combat experiences and (later) regretting those experiences will lead to less
hawkish foreign policy positions. Specifically, the psychological effect of guilt accounts for
changes in behavior and how an individual considers past actions (Opp and Samson, 1989).
Consistent with this conceptual framework, I argue that a more comprehensive measure of
combat experience along with a measure of guilt (or, regret) is better suited to capture the
potential influence of combat experiences on the foreign policy positions of veterans. Rather than
accounting for a combat encounter with a dichotomous variable, I therefore use a measure that
accounts for unique combat experiences. These instances of combat are not a count of the
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number of combat events that a member has experienced, but instead describe the specific
conditions surrounding unique episodes of traumatic combat events.
Consistent with prior work, I find that veterans, regardless of their combat experience,
tend to hold more hawkish attitudes than civilians. However, as veterans have more unique
combat experiences and express regret about their service, they tend to hold increasingly less
hawkish views. Thus, while prior work has found that veterans who have experienced combat are
more hawkish than veterans who have not, the present findings point towards a more nuanced
picture. The findings presented in this paper suggest that scholars ought to reconsider how
combat experience is measured, the role of regret, and the effects that combat experience has on
veterans’ policy positions more broadly.

Foreign Policy Positions, Veterans, and Combat Experience
The two archetypical foreign policy viewpoints are those of the “hawk” and “dove”
(D'Agostino, 1995; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Ray, 1981). A hawkish mindset is one that
generally pursues a foreign policy agenda that is an aggressive position of the federal
government. In contrast, a dove mindset is one that tends to want the federal government to act
in a peaceful, or passive, position.
The characteristics of “hawkishness” would appear to lend themselves to the Service
member, or veteran, because they have had to condition themselves for the aggression prior to,
and during, enlistment.15 Indeed, prior work finds that the foreign policy belief systems of
15

I expect the effects of combat experience on foreign policy positions to be similar for veterans
(no longer active duty) and Service members (currently enlisted). When a Service member
transitions from their time in service to civilian life, the inherent threat certainly decreases for the
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veterans and nonveterans are distinct, even after controlling for individuals’ age, race, and
education (Kirkpatrick and Regens, 1978). This may be because of a selection effect, where
individuals with certain characteristics opt-in to service (Bachman, Sigelman, and Diamond,
1987; Cockerman, 1978; Dorman, 1976; Schreiber, 1979). Alternatively, it could be due to a
socialization effect, where while an individual is in the military they become conditioned to
behave or act in certain ways (Shay, 1994). Or, both self-selection and socialization could be
operating. Whatever the mechanism, the first hypothesis I test is the following:
H1: Consistent with prior work, veterans are more hawkish than civilians.

Regardless of how an individual became acclimated to military service (self-selection or
socialization), witnessing military combat has untold effects on the outlook of Service members
(Grossman and Christensen, 2007; Grossman D. , 2014; Kennedy and Zillmer, 2012). I
specifically focus on the effects of combat experience on foreign policy stances. Service
members who spent their time in the military serving out the United States foreign policy goals
may have those opinions altered by the experiences that they endure. The shock and disconnect
that occurs when Service members experience the brutality of combat may be enough to make
them rethink the way that they believe the United States should conduct its foreign policy
objectives. Moreover, the more combat experiences that a Service member endures opens up the

individual veteran, but this does not mean that veterans’ focus on global events (specifically
events where the military is involved) should wane. Indeed, in their panel survey Jennings and
Markus (1977) find that Service members who return home from deployment turn their attention
to international issues from local issues, especially in comparison to civilians. Therefore, I posit
that treating veterans the same as active duty Service members does not pose a problem when
examining their foreign policy beliefs. Given that 14.93% of my sample consists of veterans, I
refer to the sample as a sample of veterans. When I restrict my primary analysis to only veterans
(by excluding active duty or reservist Service members), the substantive results are unchanged
(see Table A4.1).
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member to the many facets of war. Combat experience is much more than the training that a
Service member undergoes. When it is an actual human firing, or detonating explosives, it
becomes much more real than any downrange targeting scenario could ever prepare a member to
experience (Jones 2006). When there are actual consequences to the fighting, the effects of that
linger and last in the psyche of a Service member long after they leave their theater of operations
(Jones, 2006; Fergusson, 2000; Bourke, 2000; Solomon, Mikulincer, and Avitzur, 1988;
Marshall, 2000; Danieli, 1988; Shay, 1994).
To be sure, theorizing about the effects of combat experience on policy attitudes is not a
new endeavor. However, the majority of research on this subject focuses on how combat
experience affects the decision making of elites – i.e. heads of state and/or military officers
(Brunk, Secrest, and Tamashiro, 1990; Carter and Nordstrom, 2017; Feaver and Gelpi, 2005;
Horowitz and Stam, 2014; Sechser, 2004; Weeks, 2012). By and large, research on political
elites cannot assist in a general understanding of the public at large, because leaders and average
survey respondents differ in some very systematic ways (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 2009).
Nevertheless, I first discuss some of the literature in this area that focuses on the opinions of
elites, before moving to some specific recent studies that focus more so on the general public,
including veterans who are not officers.
One of the earliest considerations of how military service might be associated with
political behavior is found in Huntington’s (1957) argument centered on “military conservatism.”
Huntington argued that when comparing military leaders to civilians, the inexperience of
civilians in armed combat scenarios might increase the willingness of civilians to support the use
of force. He posited that the organizational interests of the military are enough to interest military
officers to not use force, which can destabilize country relations and future theaters of war. More
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recent work has found empirical support for this argument. For instance, Feaver and Gelpi
(2005) find that elites with military experience are more hesitant to use force (to initiate
interstate conflict) than elites without military experience. Similarly, Horowitz and Stam (2014)
report that leaders with military service without combat experience are more likely to initiate
militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) than both leaders of countries who served in the military
who have combat experience and leaders with no military service.
Conversely, some scholars argue that military officers might prefer to use force because
their training is in using force and not in diplomacy or economic options that other branches of
the government handle (see Brecher (1996)). In this vein, Sechser (2004) finds that soldiers are
more likely to want to increase the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes than elected
officials. Moreover, it is the group of military officers that are more likely than civilians to be in
favor of using the military force for resolution to international problems. More broadly, Bunk,
Secrest, and Tamashiro (1990) study the morality and ethics of military combat experience. They
show that individuals with more combat experience are more accepting of risk when they
evaluate issues on ethics and warfare. Furthermore, Chatagnier and Klingler (2017) find that
when Service members are asked about specific foreign policy positions (i.e., support/opposition
of U.S. intervention in Syria), those with more combat experience tend to hold more hawkish
views with respect to intervening in Syria.
In short, to date there is mixed evidence concerning the role of combat experience in the
formation of veterans’ foreign policy positions. Some of this mixed evidence is likely a product
of the context of the studies (e.g., whether veterans are asked about specific foreign policy
situations, like whether to intervene in Syria, or more general scenarios) and who the study
focuses on (e.g., elected officials who previously served, military officers, or other members of
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the military). I contend that the different ways in which combat experience is conceptualized and
measured might also matter for understanding the link between combat experience and the
foreign policy positions of veterans.
Combat Experience and Regret
In Chapter 2, I discussed the six different categories of possible traumatic deployment
experiences: moral injury by self, moral injury by others, traumatic loss, life threat to self, life
threat to others, and aftermath of violence (Stein, et al., 2012). In addition, one of the feelings
often associated with combat is the guilt (or, regret) that comes when a Service member
witnesses combat trauma or other devastating effects associated with being in conflict with
adversaries (Opp and Samson 1989). I contend that military members who experience the trauma
associated with combat and the potential regret or guilt that permeates from those traumatic
combat experiences might feel differently about future military engagements abroad.
While not explicitly referencing Opp and Samson (1989), Stein et al. (2012) contend that
guilt is often a consequence associated with Moral Injury. Experiencing this type of guilt leads
Service members to re-experience these events, which brings about hindsight bias and thoughts
of wrongdoing. Aftermath of Violence also alters individuals’ perceptions of the world.
Specifically, it brings about negative cognitions about the world. Both of these events are the
types of traumatic events that “stick” with a Service member after they end their time in the
military. Both of these events can lead to a negative reevaluation of the veteran’s perception of
the military’s role in global affairs, especially if they later regret their actions. 16

16

The biggest distinction between these traumatic events is something that this survey is not
designed to account for, the Moral Injury inflicted on the Service member at the time of the
event. Each one of the events measured in this survey could potentially lead to Moral Injury
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Based on this military psychology literature, I argue that veterans who experienced more
combat, and have more regret about their experience, will be more likely to not support policies
or strategies that promote greater military involvement (Horowitz and Stam, 2014). Again, I do
not envision combat as a simple count of the number of deployments that a Service member went
on or the total number of events they witnessed. Instead, I intend to measure unique episodes that
veterans witness during their time on deployment and while in combat zones. Ultimately, if the
veteran acknowledges and reflects on the reality of combat and the effects of battle, then they
might be less likely to encourage or want current Service members to face the same realizations
that combat veterans face. Thus, I test the following hypothesis:
H2: The more combat experience and the more regret a military veteran has, the
less hawkish they will be compared to veterans with less combat experience and
regret.

To summarize, one of the overarching assumptions from previous research is that
veterans typically hold more hawkish foreign policy stances than nonveterans (H1). However, I
expect that combat experience will differentiate veterans—combat experience and especially the
increased occurrence of individual regret associated with unique military combat experiences
(H2), will result in less hawkish foreign policy stances among those veterans.

occurring (which is the result of a Service member witnessing/experiencing death), Life Threat
(the exposure of the threat of death or serious injury), and/or Aftermath of Violence (exposure to
sights, sounds, smells of grotesque or haunting images). Traumatic Loss is the only event that
can only be one event: witnessing the death of fellow soldiers. With this type of event, there is a
vested relationship that has ended due to the violence that has been experienced in combat.
Ultimately, these elements of combat work in tandem and it depends on how the veteran
processes these events (i.e., if they regret their time in service or not) on how this affects their
foreign policy beliefs. Specifically, the guilt (Opp and Samson 1989) that the veteran feels about
the combat that they experienced during their time in the military alters the way that they feel
about the role the United States should play in foreign affairs.
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Research Design and Data
To examine the association between combat experience and the foreign policy positions
of veterans, I utilize the same survey from Qualtrics as was used previously. The questions from
the Qualtrics survey that I use for this chapter are dedicated to discerning the respondent’s
foreign policy positions. A common approach to asking about foreign policy preferences used in
prior work is to ask individuals: (1) whether the U.S. should get involved in a foreign affair and
(2) if involvement is desired, whether the U.S. should use military or diplomatic solutions
(Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987). That is, rather than directly asking individuals if they consider
themselves to be more “hawkish” or “dovish” (terms they may not readily understand), scholars
often measure foreign policy positions by asking general questions about the U.S. engaging in
international interactions.
In line with this approach, I asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they
(dis)agreed with six statements about U.S. foreign policy. These questions, modified from
Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), are designed to measure a respondent’s general disposition towards
U.S. foreign policy. The questions involve the following topics: involvement of the military
overseas, using foreign aid instead of military force, the United States as a dominant military
force, using the military to stop terrorists, utilizing international organizations to achieve
objectives, and the respondent’s views on terrorism. For each item, the response options were
strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, and strongly agree. 17 The complete
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Krosnick et al. (2002) find that when assessing individuals’ opinions there was typically no
difference between offering “don’t know” options and when those options were withheld.
57

question wording for the survey is included in the Appendix, including a comparison of Hurwitz
and Peffley’s (1987) and my question wording in Appendix Table A4.2.
From these six questions, I created a scalable variable of the respondent’s foreign policy
opinions. Not all questions were listed with the most hawkish choice as “strongly agree,” so
three questions were rescaled so that the highest value was the more hawkish choice. After
creating the index, the variable was rescaled to range from zero to one with higher values
equating to more hawkish foreign policy stances. Thus, the primary dependent variable for this
study is the respondent’s foreign policy stance, Hawkishness (Cronbach’s alpha of 0.64), in
which higher scores indicate more hawkish preferences. 18
To measure combat experience, I draw from the military psychology literature discussed
above (e.g., Opp and Samson 1989; Hoge et al. 2004; Stein et al. 2012). I asked veterans five
specific questions about their combat experience: whether they had (1) witnessed the effects of
improvised explosive devices (which might reflect experiencing Life Threat and/or Aftermath of
Violence), (2) engaged in gunfire exchanges while in foreign countries (Life Threat), and
witnessed the death of (3) enemy combatants (Life Threat and/or potentially Moral Injury), (4)
civilians (Moral Injury), or (5) fellow service members (Moral Injury and/or Traumatic Loss).
The use of the term “witnessed” is in line with the military psychology literature, which argues
that even if veterans have indirect experience with combat it is still likely to cause psychological
harm (Stein, et al., 2012).
Respondents could indicate that they experienced anywhere from zero to all five of these
combat scenarios. Respondents who indicated they experienced none of these events were scored

18

In additional analysis presented below, I consider whether different formulations of the
dependent variable affect the interpretation of my results.
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0 (42.5% of the veteran sample), those who indicated they experienced all five were scored 5
(21.0%), and the remaining veterans fell somewhere in between (1 [13.0%], 2 [6.5%], 3 [9.0%],
or 4 [8.0%] combat experiences). 19 This variable is also standardized to range from zero
(civilians are scored as 0) to one for ease of interpretation in the OLS models presented below.
Higher values on the Combat Events variable equate to more instances of combat that the
respondent reported experiencing; lower values indicate that the respondent reported
experiencing fewer unique combat scenarios.
Additionally, veterans were asked how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the
statement, “I have no regrets about actions I was a part of while deployed” (strongly disagree,
somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, strongly agree). The variable Regret (standardized to range
from 0-1, where civilians are scored as 0) is reversed coded so that higher values reflect
respondents who expressed more regret about the actions they were a part of while deployed.

Results
I estimate a series of OLS regressions to test the effect of combat experience on foreign
policy stances. Each regression controls for a respondent’s level of education (education; five
point scale: some high school or less, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and
graduate school degree), gender (male; 1 represents male respondents and 0 female), partisanship
(dichotomous indicators for Democrat and Republican, where Independent is the omitted,
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Of the 200 military respondents, 115 (57.5%) reported at least one combat experience. Table
2.2 displays the percentage of veterans who reported experiencing each specific combat scenario.
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reference category), and race (white, as a dichotomous variable where 1 is white and 0 is nonwhite).20
Table 4.1 presents the results for a test of H1. Model 1 of Table 4.1 displays the results of
a baseline model that does not include any measure of military experience. The results reaffirm
earlier work that white respondents and Republicans tend to hold more hawkish positions
(Gerber and Jackson, 1993), whereas those with higher levels of education and Democrats tend
to hold less hawkish positions. In Model 2, having served in the military (Military, scored 1 for
veterans and 0 for civilians) is introduced. The results of Model 2 indicate that veterans (p<0.01)
are more hawkish than civilians, providing clear support for H1.21 This is likely due to either a
military self-selection or socialization effect. However, the present data cannot distinguish
between these two potential mechanisms, and the difference is not the main focus of this paper,
but importantly (given the consistent results) does suggest that my sample is consistent with prior
samples used in the study of veterans.

20

Among veterans, there are 29 respondents in the non-white category: 11 Hispanic or Latino,
12 black or African American, and 6 Asian or Pacific Islander. Given the small number of
individuals from specific minority groups among veterans, I utilize the single indicator for white
or non-white.
21
This difference between veterans and civilians is evident for almost all of the individual
foreign policy items (see Table A4.3).
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Table 4.1. Veterans Tend To Be More Hawkish than Civilians, Full Sample
(1)
(2)
Hawkishness Hawkishness
(0-1)
(0-1)
Military = 1
Male = 1
White = 1
Education (0-1)
Republican = 1
Democrat = 1
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.00201
(0.00805)
0.0247***
(0.00871)
-0.0308**
(0.0144)
0.0692***
(0.0102)
-0.0172*
(0.00912)
0.548***
(0.0127)

0.0315***
(0.0122)
-0.00647
(0.00856)
0.0239***
(0.00871)
-0.0344**
(0.0145)
0.0673***
(0.0102)
-0.0171*
(0.00912)
0.550***
(0.0126)

1,199
0.087

1,199
0.093

Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in
parentheses. The dependent variable is an index variable
(Hawkishness) that equates to higher scores on this
variable indicating more hawkish preferences. Reported
p-values are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The analysis presented in Table 4.2 provides a test of H2. Table 4.2 includes an analysis
of the entire sample. A separate analysis containing only the 200 veterans can be found in
Appendix Table A4.4, and produces consistent results. Model 1 of Table 4.2 provides a test of
the effect of only experiencing unique combat events on foreign policy positions (i.e., ignoring
Regret for the moment). Those that have more combat experience are not less hawkish than
veterans and civilians with no combat experience. The coefficient is in the expected direction
(negative), but it is not statistically significant (p=0.226). Model 2 of Table 4.2 adds Regret to
Model 1 to account for variability in veterans’ expressed regret about their time in the military.
Regret is negative and statistically significant (p<0.001), which indicates that veterans who
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expressed more regret about the actions that they were a part of held less hawkish foreign policy
beliefs than civilians and veterans with no regrets about their time in service. In addition, the
Combat Events variable is still negative, but not statistically significant. Recall, however, that the
military psychology literature suggests that regret (or, guilt) is generally associated with the
experience of traumatic combat events. Therefore, in Model 3 I interact Combat Events with
Regret to test H2.
Table 4.2. Effect of Combat and Regret on Foreign Policy Stances, Full Sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
Hawkishness Hawkishness Hawkishness
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
Combat Events (0-1)

-0.0309
(0.0255)

-0.0288
(0.0240)
-0.0928***
(0.0207)

0.0434***
(0.0149)
-0.00678
(0.00855)
0.0232***
(0.00872)
-0.0347**
(0.0145)
0.0679***
(0.0102)
-0.0167*
(0.00915)
0.550***
(0.0126)

0.0778***
(0.0164)
-0.00842
(0.00852)
0.0226***
(0.00873)
-0.0373**
(0.0145)
0.0685***
(0.00995)
-0.0157*
(0.00915)
0.552***
(0.0127)

Regret Military Actions (0-1)
Combat x Regret
Military = 1
Male = 1
White = 1
Education (0-1)
Republican = 1
Democrat = 1
Constant

0.0206
(0.0317)
-0.0439
(0.0277)
-0.127***
(0.0472)
0.0597***
(0.0176)
-0.00892
(0.00852)
0.0225**
(0.00874)
-0.0382***
(0.0144)
0.0676***
(0.00994)
-0.0161*
(0.00912)
0.553***
(0.0127)

Observations
1,199
1,199
1,199
R-squared
0.094
0.111
0.117
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The
dependent variable is an index variable (Hawkishness) that equates to higher
scores on this variable indicating more hawkish preferences. Reported p-values
are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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The results from Model 3 of Table 4.2 suggest that as veterans have more unique combat
experiences and express more regret about their time in service, they tend to be less hawkish
(p=.007). The interactive effect of Combat Events and Regret is displayed graphically in Figure
4.1. The solid darker line represents veterans who did not express any regret about their time in
the military (i.e., Regret = 0). For these individuals, as we move from zero (no combat
experience) to one (all five combat events experienced) there is no statistically significant change
in their hawkishness. Alternatively, for veterans who express the most regret (i.e., Regret = 1)
about their time in the military (represented by the lighter dotted line), moving from no combat
experience (zero on the x-axis) to the most combat experience (one on the x-axis) results in a
statistically significant decrease in their hawkishness. Equally of substantive importance, among
veterans who report the most individual combat experiences (i.e., the 42 who report experiencing
all five and are therefore scored 1 on Combat Events), there is a statistically significant
difference between those who express the most regret (level of Hawkishness = .42) and those
who do not express any regret (level of Hawkishness = .59). In short, in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1
there is evidence to support H2.
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Additional Analysis
Overall, the results presented thus far suggest that veterans tend to be more hawkish than
the civilian population (in support of H1), but that the more unique combat experiences and
regret veterans report the less hawkish they tend to be (consistent with H2). In this section, I
report four sets of additional analysis to ascertain the robustness of the results reported above.
First, I test whether the area that veterans were deployed to or a specific branch of the military
moderate the effects shown above. Second, I test whether veterans of both political parties
exhibit a similar pattern of results. Third, I test whether modifications to the Hawkishness index
result in any change to the results. Last, I test whether specific combat experiences might be
driving the results.
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To test whether the veterans’ deployment region or branch in which they served
conditioned the association between combat, regret, and hawkishness, I estimated a series of
regressions using the specification reported in Model 3 of Table 4.2, but restricted to specific
deployment regions (Vietnam and Iraq/Afghanistan, the two deployment regions with the most
respondents; see Table A4.5 for a full breakdown of veterans by deployment region) or branches
(Army, Navy, and Air Force, the three branches with the most respondents, as noted above). The
results of these regressions are displayed in Table A9. The results displayed there (and in Figures
A4.1 and A4.2) offer some suggestive evidence that veterans deployed to Iraq/Afghanistan and
those in the Army might be most responsible for the results observed in Table 4.2. However,
these results should be interpreted with caution given the low number of respondents from each
military branch and deployed to each region. 22 Overall, the pattern of results is consistent (even
if not statistically significant) for all five groups: either regret on its own, or regret in
combination with increased combat experience, is associated with lower levels of hawkishness.
To test whether the opinions of both Democratic and Republican veterans shift in
response to combat and regret, I estimated separate OLS regressions for Democrats and

22

Indeed, although noisier, the analysis suggests that the Navy might display equally strong
effects to the Army. This preliminary analysis is consistent with (at least) two explanations,
which would need to be explored further in future work. First, military psychologists contend
that Service members do not necessarily have to have first-hand experience seeing the effects of
combat for the psychological trauma of combat to have an effect. Simply knowing that an event
occurred could lead to similar feelings among Service members. So, even though the
presumption might be that veterans from the Army or the Marines would be the ones more likely
to have combat experience (seeing as these are the branches that have been deployed to regions
that consistently have combat instead of within squadrons or on ships) and therefore “feel” the
effects of it, this might not necessarily be the case. Second, with the constant state of deployment
that the Army and Marine Corps find themselves in, they often turn to the other branches to
supply members to fill spots in deployments. This means that members of the Navy who
generally serve aboard vessels are able to serve on deployments alongside members from other
branches.
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Republicans using the Table 4.2, Model 3 specification. These results appear in Appendix Table
A4.7 and Figure A4.3. The results of this analysis suggest that even though Republicans are on
average more hawkish than Democrats, consistent with a theory of Moral Injury, the
psychological effects of the trauma of combat apply to both Democrats and Republicans. This
suggests that it is not simply partisanship in combination with regret that is driving my results
instead of combat and regret.
In order to test whether the way in which the measure of hawkishness is constructed
influences the results, I created two additional measures of “hawkishness.” One measure includes
the three items regarding preferences that a respondent would choose a United States “militaryfirst” approach: involvement of the military overseas, maintaining the United States as a
dominant military force, and using the military to stop terrorists. These questions focused more
on the ability of the military to engage and act across the globe. Like Hawkishness, Military First
is an index variable with higher scores indicating a more hawkish preference (rescaled to range
from 0-1, Cronbach’s alpha of 0.730). The second measure covers the three remaining items
(foreign aid instead of military force, utilizing international organizations to achieve objectives,
and the respondent’s views on terrorism). These items (Other Action) focus a bit more on how
respondents feel toward the utilization of outside countries or agencies and understanding the
level of military force (if at all) that should be necessary for completing the objective. Other
Action is also an index variable (rescaled to range from 0-1, Cronbach’s alpha of 0.419) with
higher scores equating to a more hawkish foreign policy stance.
Appendix Tables A4.8 (Military First) and A4.10 (Other Action) display the results for
the full sample with models that are otherwise identical to those reported in Tables 4.1 (columns
1 and 2) and 4.2 (columns 3-5) except for the changes to the dependent variable (results for only
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among veterans can be found in Tables A4.9 and A4.11 for Military First and Other Action,
respectively). The results suggest stronger associations between combat experience, regret, and
hawkishness for the Military First items compared to the Other Action items. For ease of
interpretation, the main results are displayed graphically in Figure A4.4. As the figures make
clear, the Military First measure more closely approximates the results presented in Figure 4.1
than the Other Action measure does. As Military First includes the three items (involvement of
the military overseas, maintaining the United States as a dominant military force, and using the
military to stop terrorists) that arguably are most closely related to “hawkishness,” this
supplemental analysis lends support to the interpretation of the main results.
Finally, to ascertain whether specific combat experiences might be driving the results,
Appendix Table A4.12 presents the results of individual regression models that include an
indicator for each specific combat event (instead of my measure of Combat Events) and an
interaction of that indicator with Regret. For all five combat events, the interaction term is
negative, as expected. Further, for four of the five (all except for IED), the interaction term is
statistically significant. Substantively, as Figure A4.5 shows, the interactive effects are for the
most part similar as well. Thus, it does not appear that any specific combat experience is
necessarily responsible for the results. 23
Discussion

23

The difference between those who express the most regret and those who do not express any
regret among veterans who report witnessing each individual combat scenario is as follows:
IED experience (no regret = .639; regret = .533 [difference = .106]); gunfire exchanges (no
regret = .659; regret = .507 [difference = .152]); seeing ‘friendly’ die (no regret = .633; regret =
.486 [difference = .151]); seeing ‘enemy’ die (no regret = .653; regret = .495 [difference =
.158]); seeing civilian die (no regret = .632; regret = .478 [difference = .154]).
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Many veterans engage in combat while serving their country. The results presented above
suggest that when they experience more unique instances of combat and express regret about
their service time, they are likely to be less hawkish as a result. The fact that increased exposure
to combat experiences is associated with less hawkish foreign policy positions among those who
expressed regret might make policy makers question the actions that they are taking when they
send our Military Services into harm’s way. Veterans who witnessed war-zone traumatic events
had to calculate the costs of going to war (and the individual traumatic costs for military
personnel) against the relative expected gains that military engagement can bring. If the Service
members who are assigned to combat situations are returning with less support for more direct
military involvement, the policy makers may want to listen to the “troops on the ground” who
are experiencing the results of legislative decisions from Washington, DC. Additionally, this
study raises the possibility that there may be certain military events that Service members
experience that make them less hawkish than civilians without military experience. If the U.S.
continues to fill their positions with an all-volunteer fighting force, it may be the case that the
citizenry is consistently isolated from the effects of combat. If that is the case, then they have no
personal reason, barring a relationship to a (combat) veteran, to dissuade the government from
sending the military into harm’s way.
In addition to these substantive results and their implications, this research also furthers
the conversation of how researchers should conceptualize and quantify the combat experiences
of veterans. Engagement with the military psychology literature suggests that military combat
can have a profound effect on veterans and their understanding of the world around them. In this
vein, I find that the effects of increased instances of combat experience can alter the way that
veterans view the military’s engagement with the world, especially if they express regret about
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their time in service. Prior studies that measured combat exposure by either accounting for
whether the veteran deployed to conflict regions or exchanged gunfire with the opposition could
benefit from the inclusion of this measure of combat experience, as it may produce not only
more theoretically grounded results, but also more empirically nuanced ones. 24 In short, simply
having “served under fire” may not encompass the totality of member attitude alterations that
prior scholars have studied (Brunk, Secrest, Tamashiro 1990; Cockerman and Cohen 1980).
There are a number of ways in which this line of inquiry can be extended in future work,
but I wish to highlight three here. First, having more respondents who were drafted could
provide a way to separate the self-selection and socialization effects of the military. Respondents
in this study were primarily veterans who had volunteered for military service. As such, the
present data cannot speak to any potential differences in the effect of combat experiences
between those who volunteer for or are drafted into military service. 25 Additionally, the region in
which the Service member is deployed might potentially matter, if the different ways that the
U.S. has fought its wars over the years has changed how combat is experienced and the effects it
has on veterans (although the additional analysis reported in Table A9 suggests this may not
necessarily be the case, at least when comparing Vietnam to Iraq/Afghanistan).
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It is the case that when a dichotomous measure of combat is used in place of my more detailed
measure in Table 4.2, the results are consistent in terms of sign and direction (see Table A4.13).
However, the interactive effect of combat experience with regret is stronger using my measure,
consistent with the theory I’ve outlined based on the military psychology literature. Specifically,
the difference in the effect of combat experience between those who do not and do express regret
about their service is .171 using my measure (.591-.420) and .138 using the dichotomous
measure (.640-.502). The .033 difference-in-differences (.171-.138) between the two effects,
while not “large,” is the size of the statistically significant effect of education (.038 in Table 4.2,
Model 3), suggesting the difference is meaningful.
25
Approximately 20% of the Service members in my sample are old enough that they could have
been eligible for the last draft lottery. (A breakdown of Service members by age range can be
found in Appendix Table A4.17.)
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Second, including my more detailed measure of combat experience in studies of political
leaders (both military leaders and politicians who previously served in the military) may prove
difficult if there is not adequate source materials or the willingness of political leaders to divulge
enough information about their time in the military.26 For instance, it may be difficult to
ascertain whether political leaders witnessed any of the five items that make up my combat
variable. Nevertheless, if the possibility presents itself for scholars to get this information (or
other details about combat experience beyond dichotomous measures) about political leaders,
then I believe that there may be something to gain from examining the question of whether
military service depresses the instinct for military interventions among political leaders. Given
the findings in this paper, I believe that the inclusion of the military psychological effects of
combat may produce stronger results of military leaders not choosing to intervene as much
compared to leaders without military combat experience.
Third, future research should explore how intensity and proximity matter when it comes
to measuring combat. Specifically, it would behoove future scholars to engage with the
experiences of remote warriors and how they conceptualize and deal with combat through the
virtual lens of war (Ogle, Reichwald, and Rutland, 2018). More importantly, proximity to
combat can have profound effects on the way that individuals understand their combat
experiences. Although indirect knowledge can have adverse traumatic effects on veterans (Stein,
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Similarly, when attempting to measure a specific policy position about a specific country (as in
Chatagnier and Klingler’s (2017) analysis of U.S. intervention into Syria), my measure might not
produce entirely different results. Given the multitude of factors that can alter a veteran’s
perception of intervention in specific countries or under certain leaders or government structures,
it might be the case that factors specific to that case are more influential compared to the
difference between using a dichotomous measure of combat as opposed to my measure of
combat. Nevertheless, I contend that my measure better captures the range of combat experience
veterans endure.
70

et al., 2012), firsthand close proximity encounters with Moral Injury (either by self or others)
may lead to different effects on political behavior. Future research could include a more specific
measure of combat to differentiate between individuals who had combat experience firsthand and
those who learned indirectly about combat in their area of operations or with individuals whom
they were acquainted and considered close.
Even though more research is needed to better understand the effects of combat on the
foreign policy positions of American veterans, this study is one step in the direction of better
detailing the processes behind their political behavior. The present study suggests that future
work should consider that not all combat experience is equivalent, and attempt to measure
differences in the occurrence of unique combat events experienced by members of the military.
What this study cannot resolve is how intensity of combat experience and/or proximity to combat
events shape political behavior. Thus, while there is still work to be done, this paper provides an
initial step in understanding the psychological effects that traumatic events have on veterans’
political opinions.
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CHAPTER 5. TRUSTING THE PROCESS: COMBAT VETERANS TRUST IN
GOVERNMENT
Prior research shows that citizen interactions with the government and judgements of
governmental performance affects their trust in government (Citrin, 1974; Hetherington, 1998;
Hetherington, 2005). Specific subsets of the population, such as military veterans, however, have
not been examined as closely. Veterans provide a unique opportunity for study since they are a
group that are employed by the federal government (except for state national guard units) and
receive orders to deploy to foreign countries at the whims of political elites. Previous research on
civilians has shown that partisan attachments to the party of the president (Citrin 1974, Nye Jr.
1997, Keele 2007), individual interactions with government (Hetherington 2005, Mondak, et al.
2007, Maltby 2017), and government performance (Hetherington 1998) condition levels of trust
in government. The link between individual interactions with government and trust in
governments suggests that those employed by the government might also experience increased
trust as a result of their employment. A complementary expectation could also be that individuals
who choose to work for the government could have higher levels of trust in government to begin
with, which leads them toward that work environment in the first place. This dynamic may
include the members of the military who put their life on the line for their country and not only
work for the government, but also rely on the decisions of their government (Bachman and
Jennings 1975).
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between military service and
trust in government. Specifically, I analyze the difference between three separate groups:
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military veterans who have experienced combat, non-combat military veterans, and civilians. By
separating respondents into these three groups, I am able to discern the differences that each
group have in regards to trust in the government. Moreover, by analyzing trust in government
among military veterans, in line with previous work (Bachman and Jennings 1975) I examine
variations in levels of trust by the age group of combat and non-combat veterans. Additionally,
examining the differences among military veterans broadens the understanding of an
understudied group, by seeing how certain political behaviors are shaped by specific military
experiences.
Utilizing original data and data from the American National Election Study (ANES), this
chapter makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, by distinguishing the
differences between the military (government employees) and non-military civilians I theorize
and find that trust in government is higher among military veterans than civilians (Jennings and
Markus 1977). The second contribution is that this chapter adds to the existing literature
surrounding the differences between veterans with combat experience and those without
(Chatagnier and Klingler 2017, Endicott 2020). I theorize and find that veterans with combat
experience have higher trust in the government than do veterans without combat experience.
Third, this chapter points to the continued effect that combat experiences has on military
members long after they leave the armed forces. The effects of combat can have long-lasting
effects that can alter perceptions of the members in many areas of life that are assumed different
from non-military civilians. Continued research on the social and political effects that combat
experience has on military veterans is necessary to understand the effects that combat plays on
the psyche of veterans.
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Trust in Government
There are three different schools of thought when it comes to how individuals learn to
trust: static (Putnam 1993, Uslaner 2002, Uslaner and Brown 2005), particularized (Uslaner and
Brown 2005, Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994), and dynamic (Hardin 2002). Static and
particularized trust are dependent on early foundations of trust that emphasize learned behavior
and understanding the differences between in-groups and out-groups. These do not allow for life
experiences or new knowledge to alter an individual’s trust in different people or things (i.e.
groups of people, functions/departments of government, etc.). In contrast, dynamic trust allows
for trust to constantly develop as one learns new things and exposes oneself to new experiences
(Hardin 2002). This type of trust is one that is more open to a changing social, cultural, and
political landscape.
Dynamic trust is most applicable to military members. This is due to the fact that
previous research has shown that citizens who join the military have higher trust in the
government, but certain governmental actions (i.e. involvement in the Vietnam War) lead to
alterations in veteran (and civilian) levels of trust (Bachman and Jennings 1975). Due to the
previous reported changes in trust, that controls for partisanship, by Bachman and Jennings
(1975), trust among military members appears to be dynamic and therefore not a static-type of
trust.
Traditionally, when scholars discuss trust in government the discussion rests on reasons
for changes in trust over time.27 Evaluations of current political events and public officials have
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A variety of factors are associated with changes in trust in government, including economic
(Citrin and Green 1986, Citrin and Luks 1998, Feldman 1983, Hetherington 1998, Lawrence
1997, Miller 1974), social-cultural (Mansbridge, 1997; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn, 2000), and
political (Craig 1993, Craig 1996, Erber and Lau 1990, Feldman 1983, Garmnent 1991,
Hetherington 1998, Marien and Hooghe 2011, Miller and Borrelli, 1991).
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also been found to be determinants for levels of public trust (Citrin 1974, Rosenstone and
Hansen 1993). Public satisfaction with government (which is associated with public trust) is a
result of the difference between expectation and perception (Orren 1997). The wider the gap
grows between expectation and the perception of how the government is handling things only
increases this perceived gap. The problem with the public’s perception of how the government is
handling things is that the public tend to be uninformed when it comes to understanding what the
government is doing (Rainey 1997). This lack of knowledge leads to individuals becoming
skeptical of the government (Blendon, et al. 1997, Bok 1997, Nye Jr. 1997, Cook, Jacobs and
Kim 2010). Citizens tend to be critical about things that they do not know much about, especially
in regards to governmental activities (Blendon, et al. 1997). Conversely, other scholars have
argued that knowing more about what the government is doing can lead to more distrust of the
system as a whole (Hibbing and Theiss-Moore 1995, 2001). In a further examination of this
argument, Mondak et al. (2007) show that trust is dependent on whether the knowledge led to
positive or negative results. Put simply, if a citizen has a positive interaction with the
government and it leads to a positive outcome, then they are expected to return increased trust.
However, if a citizen has a negative interaction with the government, then they would have a
decrease in trust. For example, if the government increases transparency over its actions, this
may increase (or potentially decrease) citizens trust in government since the citizens would have
a better grasp for what the government was doing. Alternatively, if the government reduces
transparency it may lead to a decrease (or potentially increase) in trust because citizens would be
unable to know all of the actions of the government.

Military Member Trust in Government and the Effects of Service
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To understand what effects military service might have on trust in government, first we
must understand what type of individual tends to join the military. There are two major
theoretical bases for understanding the makeup of the military. The first is due to the selfselection of military members into service (Bachman, Sigelman and Diamond 1987, Jennings
and Markus 1977). Before an individual even embarks on any training exercise, let alone
witnesses the battlefield, individuals are joining due to some specific drive to join while there are
other individuals who have a similar lifestyle yet do not chose to join (Cockerman 1978, Dorman
1976, Schreiber 1979). Simply put, the Armed Forces of the United States is not dealing with
blank slates with the individuals who comprise their fighting forces (Jennings and Markus 1977).
The reasons that drove them to join may alter how they react when faced with obstacles or how
they behave during their time in the service. The other theoretical approach to understanding
those who serve in the military is how individuals may be conditioned during their service;
referred to as “socialization” (Shay 1994). Essentially, those who join will adapt to the way that
the military wants them to behave, think, and act. This is useful for the military because it
encourages uniformity and the ability for any service member to be replaced for whatever
reason.
Military members provide a unique research focus for trust in government. Service
members are employed by the government (both state and federal) and they should be more
knowledgeable on some aspects, specifically how the government is utilizing the military to meet
its own ends. The military takes the time to train its members into the service member that best
fits its needs and provides the opportunity for promotion and the chance to excel for those who
wish to pursue that career opportunity. One of the major differences between non-governmental
occupations and those employed by the government, is that most employers do not actively send
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their employees into situations where the employee might not make it back home whereas
military members are often confronted with this aspect of service. The United States government
trains its service members to defend themselves and others and then sometimes places them in
harm’s way, hoping that everyone will return but aware that there may be casualties. Military
members must be willing to put their faith in the command apparatus that is placing them in
dangerous circumstances (Sweeney, Thompson and Blanton 2009). The faith and trust that
military members have in their chain of command is a key reason why service members embark
on missions while wearing the uniform of the United States military (Sweeney 2010).
Previously, Bachman and Jennings (1975) found that, while overall patterns of the
decrease in trust in the government were similar for veterans and civilians, veterans who served
in Vietnam had higher trust in government than did civilians. To capture the change in trust,
Bachman and Jennings (1975) utilized a panel study consisting of military members and
civilians. The authors show how military service, and overwhelming civilian negative attitudes
about the Vietnam War, led to large decreases in overall trust in government. They also show
that among both civilians and military members, there are generational differences in trust in
government, as older generations reported lower levels of trust than younger generations. These
decreases in trust are conditional on military service, however, with veterans who served in
Vietnam holding higher trust in government (albeit lower than their levels prior to deployment)
than do civilians. However, generational effects and differences in opinions about the
government among veterans and civilians have not always been found (Schreiber 1979).
These previous studies examine combat experience among veterans as a homogenous
group (other than controlling for deployment or placement in a conflict zone). This chapter
builds upon work that utilizes my comprehensive measure of combat experience discussed in
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Chapter 2 and utilized in Chapters 3 and 4. It accounts for more variation in combat experience
instead of previously used dichotomous indicators for deployment or combat zone engagements
(Bachman and Jennings 1975, Chatagnier and Klingler 2017). Furthermore, accounting for
additional military-specific differences can lead to a more rigorous examination of what could
make veterans separate (or align) on views towards the government.
In some instances, military service is quite similar to other occupations. A macro
examination of the military shows that, like other businesses, the military aims to solve a
problem and the sum of its parts work together to meet a goal. However, what makes the military
a unique occupation is the comradery and the willingness to lay down one’s life for their “coworkers” that is shared among military members. The military is built upon the network of trust
and communication that service members rely on (Siebold 2007). Service members must know
that the individual on either side of them is willing to fight and die to protect the safety and
security of the United States of America. It is this solidarity among service members that makes
the military function efficiently (Bourdieu 1986, 249). Without having a way to account for
service members trust in the military (or specific military entities) I use a proxy of trust in the
government. Therefore, I posit that military service members will have a higher trust in
government than will non-military members. Employment by the government (military) alters
the trust the service members have in the government that potentially puts them in harm’s way. 28

Military Combat Experience

28

Evidence of attitudes of trust in government among military members, prior government
employees, and civilians from the 2012 ANES can be found in Appendix Figure A5.1. The
figure shows that military members have more trust than prior government employees or
civilians (the comparison group). I cannot show differences among military members by combat
experience because the 2012 ANES does not ask questions related to combat experience.
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Military experiences and deployment schedules are fairly random and not necessarily up
to the service member as to when and where they are sent and what experiences they will endure.
The randomness of military experience can lead to a large variation in how members experience
deployments. Differences in combat experiences could be in the form of engaging in gunfire
exchanges with the opposition, witnessing the deaths of fellow service members, the adversary,
and/or civilians, and actually being physically hurt in the line of duty (Hoge, 2004). The
enduring effects of combat experience have lasting impressions on service members (Grossman
and Christensen 2007, Kennedy and Zillmer 2012). While some prior work examines individual
cases of combat experience (Chatagnier and Klingler 2017), other work considers the multiple
facets of war that service members endure (Endicott 2020).
Experiencing combat provides a service member with the actualization of the training
they undergo. Almost all military members train to protect and defend the interests of the United
States in the event of deployment. For those who engage in combat, successfully completing the
objective of a given mission, which is the purpose of intensive military training, produces a
feeling of accomplishment (Grossman and Christensen 2007). Thus, those who train and execute
their duties in theater may have more trust in the command structure that is putting them in
positions to complete the missions they train to do.
Figure 5.1 – Conceptual Model of the Relation between Combat Experience and Trust in
Government

Note: The indicator “SM” refers to Service Members.
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Figure 5.1 displays my conceptual model in regards to expected differences in service
member’s (SM) trust in government. Every service member should endure the same types of
initial training29. However, some service members experience combat while others do not. The
actualization of training scenarios in real-world combat experience is the difference between
these two groups (Grossman and Christensen 2007). Hence, the more combat experiences that a
military member has, the more I expect them to report greater feelings of trust in the government
to do what is right. In short, I believe we might see that service members with more combat
experience will have higher levels of trust in government than service members without combat
experience. Specifically, non-combat veterans spend the vast majority of their time in the
military training to engage in combat, but due to detailing assignments, needs of the military,
medical conditions, family obligations, or countless other reasons do not end up encountering
scenarios when combat training would be used in real-life situations. As a consequence, the
extensive time allotted to training but then not having an opportunity to execute their training in
the field might lower their impressions of the federal government.
In addition, as prior research shows, there may be conditional factors that provide a
moderating effect on trust (Bachman and Jennings 1975). Specifically, older generations who
have different experiences (militarily and socially) may hold stronger feelings of distrust than
younger generations without similar shared experiences. Although, each group may have similar
combat event experiences, there may be other age-related experiences that condition or moderate
older service members trust in government. Specifically, as combat veterans age, the trust
acquired from their positive interaction while in the military (combat experience) may wane over
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Different specialized training for a service members MOS/job/rate will come after the initial
training that all service members attend.
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time due to repeated interactions with the government (particularly through the Veterans
Administration). Meaning that the more interactions combat veterans have with the government
(VA), the more that they may become distrustful of government. Therefore, based on prior
theory, I posit that among military members, age should moderate (and ultimately decrease) trust
in government as compared to younger service members.

Data and Results
To explore the relationship between military service, experience, and trust in government,
I employ my Qualtrics survey described in prior chapters. I also replicated some of the analyses
presented below using the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES). 30 For the most part,
the question wording and measurement of key variables is the same in my Qualtrics Study and
the 2012 ANES. Any exceptions are noted below. 31 The dependent variable (Trust in
Government) is measured based on responses to a single question that asks respondents how
often they can trust the federal government to do what is right. 32 Trust in Government is rescaled
to range from 0-1, with higher values indicating more trust in the government. The main
independent variables used are Veteran (a dichotomous variable scored 1 if the respondent was
in the military and 0 otherwise), Combat Events (an additive combat measure with five different

30

The 2012 ANES was the most recent year to include questions concerning both military
veteran status and respondent’s trust in government.
31
For the Qualtrics Study, summary statistics are provided for both the military sample (left side)
and non-military sample (right side) in Appendix Table A2.1. Summary Statistics (for military
and non-military) for the 2012 ANES can be found in Appendix Table A3.1.
32
“How often can you trust the federal government in Washington to do what is right?” (always,
most of the time, about half the time, some of the time, never). The dependent variable for the
2012 ANES replication is worded, “How much of the time do you think you can trust the
government in Washington to do what is right?” (just about always, most of the time, only some
of the time, never).
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combat categories33 that has been indexed and standardized for ease of interpretation in the OLS
models presented below), and Non-Combat (a dichotomous variable scored 1 if a military
member has not experienced combat and 0 otherwise). The control variables used are White
(dichotomous variable where 1 is white and 0 is non-white), Democrat (dichotomous variable
where 1 is Democrat and 0 is Republican and Independent), Republican (dichotomous variable
where 1 is Republican and 0 is Democrat and Independent), Education (standardized variable, 01, with higher values indicating more education), and Age (categorical variable with higher
values indicative of older respondents).34
To test the theory that individuals with military service will have more trust in the
government (Bachman and Jennings 1975), I estimated a series of OLS regressions (see
Appendix Table A5.1 for regression output). Panel A in Figure 5.2 presents the results for
military and nonmilitary members’ trust in government for my Qualtrics Study. Panel B displays
results from the same analysis for the 2012 ANES.
Panel A shows that veterans express more trust in government than do civilians (p=0.08).
White respondents have less trust in government (p=0.023), while Republicans (p<0.001) and
Democrats have more trust in government (p=0.01) than Independents. Respondents with higher
education also have more trust (p=0.074) whereas trust decreases with age (p<0.001). A similar
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There are five different combat experiences within the combat variable. Those experiences are
engaging in gunfire exchanges with an adversary, witnessing the deaths of friendly forces,
witnessing the deaths of adversarial forces, witnessing the deaths of civilians, and witnessing the
effects of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Veterans who indicated they experienced none
of these events were scored 0 (42.5% of the veteran sample), those who indicated they
experienced all five were scored 5 (21.0%), and the remaining veterans fell somewhere in
between (1 [13.0%], 2 [6.5%], 3 [9.0%], or 4 [8.0%] combat experiences). Of the 200 military
respondents, 115 (57.5%) reported at least one combat experience. Table 2.2 displays the
percentage of veterans who reported experiencing each specific combat scenario.
34
Age categories range from 39 years old and younger, 40-59, 60-69, to 70 years of age and
older.
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pattern of results is observed in Panel B with the exception of respondents with the most
education having less trust in the 2012 ANES sample (p<0.001). Although the difference
between veterans and civilians is not statistically significant in the 2012 ANES (p=0.581), it is
consistent with the Qualtrics sample in that the coefficient is positive.

These findings indicate that there is a difference between military veterans and civilians
with respect to their levels of trust in the government; however, that difference needs to be
analyzed further. Specifically, turning to a more rigorous examination of military experience can
better examine this phenomenon. I estimated a series of OLS regressions (see Appendix Table
A5.5 for regression output) in order to test whether combat experience results in greater levels of
trust in government. These results are displayed in Figure 5.3.
The hollow circles in Figure 5.3 display results from the entire sample where military
veterans are split into two categories—those with combat experience (Combat Events) and those
without (Non-Combat), each of which is compared to civilians. The top-most coefficient
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indicates that having more unique combat event experiences does equate to higher trust in
government in comparison to civilians (p=0.006). The same is not the case for veterans with no
combat experience (Non-Combat), who are not statistically significantly different from civilians
with respect to their trust in government (p=0.558). The rest of the results from the entire sample
are similar to the results from Panel A of Figure 5.2. When I restrict the analysis to only military
members (black circles), although it is still in the same direction the combat variable is no longer
statistically significant (p=0.244). In fact, with this smaller sample (n=200), the only variable
that is statistically significant is age (p<0.001).

Overall, the results from Figure 5.3 indicate that the more unique combat event
experiences that a veteran goes through the higher their trust in government is. This is consistent
with the theory that the actualization of training makes veterans more likely to trust the
government for putting them in a position to fulfill what they have trained to do. Additionally,
Figure 5.3 shows that older respondents hold lower feelings of trust in government. Therefore, as
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prior research shows (Bachman and Jennings 1975, Jennings and Markus 1977), taking into
account the age of the military veteran (i.e., via a multiplicative effect) could assist in the
prediction of levels of trust in the government.
Figure 5.4 displays the interactive effect that age and combat experiences have on trust in
government. These estimates are from a regression model in which Trust in Government is
regressed on Combat Events, Age, the interaction of combat event experiences and age (Combat
x Age), as well as control variables (see Model 4 of Appendix Table A5.5). Service members
without combat experience (the far-left side of the figure, 0 on the combat experiences measure)
do not have much different levels of trust in government based on their age groups. However, as
we move horizontally across the figure, we find that the effect of combat experiences on trust in
government varies by age cohort. As combat experiences increase, the youngest group of service
members (ages 39 and younger [N=50], denoted by the hollow circles) becomes more trusting in
government (an increase of 27% from having no combat experience to having every listed
combat event experience). The same is the case, although the effect is weaker, for the 40-59
years old age group (black circles [N=56]; there is an increase of 13% across the x-axis). The
two older age groups, however, exhibit a relatively flat pattern (60-69 years old [N=43], plus
signs) or a slight decline (70 years old or older [N=51], hollow diamonds; decrease in trust by
15%) in trust in government as combat experiences increase.
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These results provide support for the theory that military service (and subsequent combat
experience) leads to an increase in trust in government when compared to civilians (see Figure
5.3). The analysis restricted to military veterans provides a caveat to how to best understand
these results. The age-related differences among combat veterans could come about for various
reasons. For instance, younger cohorts of veterans might not have as many interactions with the
government as compared to older cohorts. Less opportunities for government interaction could
provide less opportunities for negative (or positive) interactions with the government.
Alternatively, older cohorts may have more negative (or positive) interactions with the
government which can alter their levels of trust. Moreover, older cohorts who may have faced
negative backlash for undesirable military campaigns may also be less likely to trust the
government as a result (Bachman and Jennings 1975). Although this may be a potential
explanation, the Qualtrics survey was not designed to test, or control, for attitudes about military
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conflicts in which veterans engaged. Therefore, the analysis cannot discern attitudes for trust in
government based on individual and public reaction to conflicts that veterans served in.
What this data can show, and speak to directly, is how trust in government may change
over time. For military veterans specifically, the more time that transpires since their last combat
experience, the more feelings of trust in the government might wane over time. 35 According to
the dynamic theory of trust, as time since combat increases there are more opportunities for trust
in government to change due to other interactions with the government. These interactions may
increase or decrease the overall trust in government. Given that we observe comparable
decreases in trust among combat veterans (Figure 5.4) and civilians (Appendix Figure A5.2) it
appears that both groups are losing trust in the government as they age. The only difference is
that among younger combat veterans they are closer to the theorized locus of trust (combat
experience) than their civilian counterpart who may not have an equally distant instance to affirm
their trust in the government. Moreover, the more time that passes could also lead to a change in
trust in the government where veterans who experience combat have more time to recollect on
their actions in the military (Grossman and Christensen 2007).

Discussion
The literature on civilian trust in government is expansive and ranges from topics
including partisanship (Citrin 1974, Nye Jr. 1997, Keele 2007), individual interactions with
government (Hetherington 2005, Mondak, et al. 2007, Maltby 2017), and government

35

The phenomenon of trust in government waning over time is also found among civilians.
Appendix Figure A5.2 displays the interactive effect of military service and age. There are clear
statistically significant differences with military veterans reporting more trust in government in
the 39 and younger and 40-59 age groups. Civilians and veterans both report similar levels of
trust in the 60-69 and 70+ age groups.
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performance (Hetherington 1998). This chapter provides a new analysis on trust in government
from an understudied group: military veterans. This chapter finds that military veterans display
more trust in government than do non-military civilians (Figure 5.2). Employment, training,
serving, and conditioning all play a role in the way that service members are different from nonmilitary civilians in regards to their attitudes towards the government. Service members have had
to place their faith and trust in the government, especially in moments when the service
members’ life was on the line. Although non-military civilians may have had reasons to depend
on the government for food, housing, or other necessities, in general, the risk to life may be
different from service members who are sent to engage in military combat.
In an analysis of the entire sample and among only military members, I find that age has
a negative relationship with trust in government (see Figures 5.3, 5.4, and Appendix Figure
A5.2). In addition, the inclusion of combat experience provides an additional factor that
separates military veterans and civilians (Figure 5.3, hollow circles). Although not every service
members’ military experience is the same, the interactive effect of combat experience and age
shows that age moderates the effect of combat experience on military veterans’ trust in
government. Younger veterans with combat experience report higher levels of trust in the
government than do older veterans with similar combat experiences. This finding gives support
for the theorized expectation that combat experience increases trust. This nuance in age and
combat experience is intriguing for myriad reasons, and underscores the fact that similar age
groups are differentiated in their trust in government by serving in the military and having
combat experience.
Military veterans are an understudied group who have unique government interaction
experiences that may alter the way they perceive the government and how they behave
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politically. Not all military veterans share the same experiences, and studying them as a
homogeneous group discounts the individual experience found in military service. Continuing to
refine and define the differences expected among subsections of military veterans allows
researchers to better grasp how different military experiences shape public attitudes and political
behavior.
Future research should analyze these distinctions between conflict zones and age of
service members to better understand service members’ trust in their government that put them in
harm’s way. This chapter cannot account for cohort effects, although a larger sample of service
members by deployment region could account for this difference and their trust in government.
Additionally, asking respondents a variety of trust-centered questions could unpack any
differences in where they place their trust. Potential questions could include asking respondents
about their trust in the military command structure, their specific representative (former or
currently), specific military branches, the Veterans Administration, and the office of the
President (or Presidents that veterans served under). For example, including questions that
measure military specific aspects of service (e.g., trust in their: squadron, platoon, company,
division, fleet, group, etc.) could help delineate how combat experience alters these perceptions.
Future research can provide a better understanding of the differences in trust among service
members and an additional way to draw a distinction between service members and civilians.
The findings presented above show that there are measurable public opinion differences
between civilians and veterans. Additionally, this chapter shows the importance related to
continuing studies of military veterans. The events that veterans experience during service to
their country shape and condition their post-military attitudes. Researching veterans can provide
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a fuller understanding of the way that government employment (and potential threats to life)
affect attitudes toward the government they serve.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
This dissertation sought to better understand how military experience, and combat
experience specifically, influences the political behavior or military veterans. The definition and
measurement of combat experience has changed a lot since the end of the Vietnam War. With a
more nuanced understanding of the psychological effects of combat trauma on military combat
veterans, I find that they engage differently with politics than non-combat veterans. As was
discovered in the empirical sections of this dissertation, combat experience leads to stronger
identification with the veteran social identity. Of note, the veteran social identity was found
among families of military veterans as well, which means that there is something happening with
those close to, or in direct connection with, the military. Military members and their families
comprise a unique block of the American electorate because they are understudied but often
times highly revered. The findings from this dissertation show that military service, and the
trauma of combat experience, alters attitudes on domestic policy (defense spending), foreign
policy (military engagement overseas), and trust in government. This dissertation provides a
substantive assessment of this understudied group while laying the foundation for future studies
in veterans’ political behavior.
One of the critical components of this dissertation, is the analysis and conceptualization
of combat experience. Prior to this dissertation, military combat experience had been measured
as a dichotomous event. Prior studies had used deployments (Jennings and Markus 1977), being
stationed in a combat zone (Horowitz and Stam 2014), and engaging in gunfire exchanges with
the enemy (Chatagnier and Klingler 2017) as measures of combat experience. While prior work
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has continued to refine the measurement of combat, I incorporate military psychology research
with the political behavior literature in order to create a more nuanced definition of the effects of
combat trauma on political behavior. The study of the traumatic effect from combat has been
well studied in the military psychology literature (Stein, et al. 2012, Ogle, Reichwald and
Rutland 2018, Griffith 2019).
Previous political behavior studies regarding military members had overlooked the
wealth of information available to understand the psychological effects of combat. Chapter Two
blends previous military psychology literature on combat trauma, guilt/regret associated with
military trauma, and political behavior. Specifically, Chapter Two discusses the five types of
military combat most frequently experienced by service members (Hoge, et al. 2004) and the
traumatic effects associated with those types of combat (Stein, et al. 2012). The inclusion of
specific combat events, with an understanding of the type of trauma that accompanies witnessing
those types of trauma, redefines our understanding of the psychological component of witnessing
military combat.
After laying the theoretical groundwork for which this dissertation is based on, I explored
the traumatic effects that witnessing military combat has on service members’ political behavior.
In Chapter 3 I find that prior military members have a veteran social identity. This identity is
strengthened when military members witness more combat events. There are additional factors
that also increase a veterans’ sense of “veteran identity.” These include if the service member
was honorably discharged from the military and if they valued their time in the service. Both of
these additional factors make intuitive sense why they would matter. If a service member leaves
the military under dishonorable or other-than-honorable conditions, there may be something that
occurred that forced the service member to leave (rather than retirement or reaching the end of
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their contract), which could make them want to distance themselves from their time in the
military instead of leaning into that identity. Similarly, if a service member does not value their
time in the service, they may be less likely to identify with an identity that may force them to
remember what caused them to not value their time. Additionally, I find that family members
(nuclear and extended) are also likely to feel close to the veteran identity. As a family member of
a service member, you are prone to be impacted by moving with the service member and
experiencing the highs and lows of the military.
In Chapter 3 I also find that service members with combat experience identify more with
their veteran social identity than they do with their party. Specifically, I find that among strong
and weak Republicans/Democrats, military veterans are more likely to report higher feeling
thermometer ratings for the military than their own in-party feeling thermometer rating.
Additionally, I tested the robustness of this finding among respondents in the 2012 American
National Election Studies (ANES) and also found that military veterans were more likely to have
“warmer” feelings toward the military than their own in-party feeling thermometer ratings. The
only difference being that there was no statistically significant difference between strong
Republican veterans and strong Republican civilians. Lastly, I find that military members are
more likely than civilians to support domestic spending policies that favor either the status quo
or an increase in defense spending.
While I report findings concerning domestic policy attitudes in Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 I
analyze the effect that the trauma of combat has on veterans’ foreign policy attitudes. The initial
analysis shows that in a comparison of combat veterans, non-combat veterans, and civilians,
witnessing combat leads to less hawkish attitudes. However, when the sample was restricted to
military members, having combat experience was not associated with more or less hawkish
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policy attitudes. The null findings among military members prompted further examination of the
interactive effect of combat and regret regarding one’s time in the military. The military
psychology literature on guilt/regret has found that when service members have regret about
their time in service it may lead to negative attitudes about their time in service. When these two
characteristics were interacted, we see that military veterans with combat experience and regret
associated with their combat experience support less hawkish policy options than veterans with
combat experience and no regret and those without combat experience.
Chapter 5 provides the final empirical analysis for this dissertation where I look at the
effect that combat experience has on veterans’ trust in government. Utilizing the 2012 ANES, I
first look to compare military veterans’ level of trust in the government compared to other
individuals with prior federal government employees and civilians with no prior or current
federal government work experience. I show that military veterans report higher levels of trust
than do either of the other two groups. In a comparison of combat veterans, non-combat veterans,
and civilians, I find that combat veterans are more trusting of the government than are noncombat veterans and civilians. However, when I test this only among military veterans, I do not
find a difference in trust in government between combat and non-combat veterans. One aspect of
combat is that there are potential long-term effects of witnessing the trauma of combat. This
often requires following up with the Veterans’ Administration (VA) to continue to cover injuries
and ailments sustained during their time in combat. It is not a secret that the VA has difficulty
meeting the needs of veterans (Selnick 2021) and is often seen as inept in being able to treat
veterans seeking treatment (Philpott 2017). This led to examining the interactive effect of combat
experience and age.
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As a combat veteran leaves the military, they are encouraged by the idea that their
benefits after service will provide for them. It is only after continued (often times negative)
interactions with the VA that these attitudes may tend to sour and their trust in the government
starts to decline. For failing to provide timely and appropriate treatment for wounds and injuries
sustained during combat, veterans start to see the government as not living up to the expectations
that are expected and this leads to the assumed decrease in trust.

Implications for Veterans and Veterans’ Research
The findings from the empirical chapters have a variety of implications for understanding
the role that combat has on veterans’ political behavior. First of all, the way that we
conceptualize military combat experience matters to the way that we understand its effects.
Combat is multifaceted and assuming that it can simply be controlled for as a dichotomous
measure fails to take into consideration the psychological effect that witnessing trauma may have
on service members. If we can understand that humans are able to learn from their past behavior
(Hardin 2002), then we should treat combat trauma as a learning experience as well. When
veterans interact with the government or espouse political beliefs, we must realize these attitudes
are formed from a unique experience, which (thankfully) relatively few individuals must endure.
We know that citizen’s political attitudes may be shaped through early socialization
(Campbell, et al. 1960). The results from my empirical chapters show that veterans’ political
behavior my change depending on the events experienced during their time in service. The two
major theories surrounding military service members are the self-selection and socialization
theories (Bachman, Sigelman and Diamond 1987, Cockerman 1978, E. M. Schreiber 1979, Shay
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1994). Self-selection argues that individuals who join the military fit the mold that the military
already expects, which is why we see similar attitudes among veterans as they leave the service
(Jennings and Markus 1977). Socialization theory argues that the transition to similarity occurs
during the military as they condition service members to be a certain way (Shay 1994). While the
results in this dissertation cannot specifically point to which theory is absolutely correct (because
the assumption used in the analysis is that military attitudes would be similar had it not been for
combat experience), I do believe that these findings point more to supporting the socialization
theory. I argue that these findings provide further evidence that there is something occurring
among military members during their time in the military to shape attitudes/behaviors, rather
than relying on set characteristics and similarity prior to joining. If it was a self-selection effect
only, then what occurs during your time in the military would not matter. Whether it is the
military that is socializing service members, or the actions that they are performing on behalf of
the military, the findings from this dissertation suggest that self-selection alone cannot account
for service member output. Moreover, the fact that experiencing combat is not something that a
service member can predict or expect, and we see a difference in individuals who witness combat
trauma, suggests that the findings here show that self-selection by itself cannot account for the
attitudes and behaviors of service members after their time in the military is over.
Additionally, this dissertation consciously attempted to examine the attitudes of enlisted
military members. Prior research has primarily focused on officers and leaders’ attitudes in the
military (Horowitz and Stam 2014, Carter and Nordstrom 2017, Carter and Smith 2020). While it
is important to understand the attitudes of those making the decisions in the military, this group
makes up a relatively small subset of the military population – roughly 18% (U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2021). Focusing on the attitudes of enlisted military personnel provides a voice
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to a group that is often overlooked. Comprising 82% of the military, there is no obvious public
perception distinction between enlisted and officer veterans. Both groups are still honored,
revered, and treated with respect among the American public. By focusing the analysis on
enlisted service members, this dissertation is able to better understand the way that combat
experience shapes political behavior for a group that is more likely to engage in combat in the
first place (Hoge, et al. 2004).
The findings also show that military veterans are not a monolithic bloc. Similar to the
analysis above about combat experience, how we identify former or current military service
members matters to how we wish to test their attitudes. There is a nuance to understanding
veterans’ political behavior that future scholars should keep in mind when studying these
individuals as a group. Specifically, identifying them only as “veterans” or “military” is an
oversimplification. Each empirical chapter in this dissertation has shown that there are certain
characteristics of service that impact veterans’ political behavior. In Chapter 3 it was combat
experience, honorable discharge, and valuing their time in the military. In Chapter 4 the
characteristics that mattered were combat experience and regret about their time in the military.
In Chapter 5, combat experience and age were the primary factors that influenced their trust in
government. In short, simply treating veterans or military members as a dichotomous group in an
analysis is insufficient.

Limitations
Although this dissertation provided a good first-step in understanding the role that
combat plays in shaping the political behavior of military veterans there are four specific
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limitations of this dissertation that further examinations into this topic should consider. First,
proximity to combat is not controlled for. In the military psychology literature, the trauma of
combat experience occurs when service members “witness” combat events (Stein, et al. 2012).
Witnessing combat can come from first-hand experience or it could come from hearing about an
incident from others who did personally experience the event. Controlling for how military
veterans “witness” combat can refine our understanding of the phenomenon. This could be in the
form of asking combat veterans how they experienced combat (either first-hand or through an
intermediary). As some of the literature on intelligence analysts and unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) operators show, experiencing death and trauma – even through the medium of a screen –
can lead to traumatic injury, especially for analysts or operators who need to continually reexperience missions with trauma for analyzing battle damage assessment (BDA) reports (Ogle,
Reichwald and Rutland 2018). Providing more avenues for combat veterans to explain their
combat experience can lead to a refinement in our ability to understand the traumatic effects of
combat.
An additional way that proximity can be measured is by asking the type of munition or
weapon that was used by the service member during their combat experience. This particularly
focuses on combat veterans who exchanged gunfire with the opposition. Basing proximity on the
caliber of the weapon (due to different effective firing ranges) or type of weapon (e.g., knife,
handgun, rifle, mortar, etc.) can also provide more nuance to the proximity of the event even if
service members are unable to provide exact physical distances to the combat event.
Second, another opportunity to refine the measurement of combat could come in the
intensity or frequency of combat experiences. As the variable is measured now, respondents
selected if they had witnessed any of the five experiences that comprise the most impactful
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traumatic events in the military psychology literature. Providing additional questions to measure
the times that service members experienced each event could also provide a comparison to see
how attitudes are changed with the number of times that a service member experienced one or
more of the five events. Additionally, the intensity of each event could also matter for how
traumatic these events are for service members. For example, service members who witness one
fellow service member killed by a bullet fired from an enemy combatant may elicit different
traumatic feelings than witnessing a group of service members that are killed by mortars, air-tosurface armament, and/or large explosive devices. The current construction of the variable will
count each of those events as similar. While seeing a fellow service member die in front of you
(regardless of what leads to their death) can be traumatic, the intensity of the second example
make lead to more intense traumatic effects to the service member.
The third limitation of this dissertation is there were relatively few service members who
were drafted and there was not a substantive opportunity to compare volunteer service member’s
attitudes to those who were drafted. Normatively, this would provide a unique opportunity to
analyze the difference in individuals on how they came to join the military, but it also can speak
to the bulk of veteran scholarship emanating from the end of the Vietnam War. In most of the
chapters of this dissertation, age of the respondent was a statistically significant predictor of
many of the attitudes being assessed. However, due to the relatively diminished number of
draftees in this survey, there was very little statistical power to test the effects of being drafted
into the military. Larger samples of veteran respondents can overcome this limitation.
A final limitation concerns the size of this sample and the unintended consequences of a
relatively small sample: lack of military branch effects. The expectation of almost every service
member (regardless of branch) is that if called upon, you will be ready, able, and willing to
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“fight” to protect your country. How individuals are expected to “fight” may be up to the specific
job designation assigned to each service member and how the needs of the military are expected
to be met. However, there might be some branches who could potentially be more readily
available to “fight” in the spirit that most civilians expect service members to fight; namely,
infantry members of the Army and Marine Corps. While Air Force members are routinely
stationed overseas in foreign lands, there is less emphasis on Air Force ground forces than there
are in the Army or Marine Corps. Additionally, the Navy’s use of military force is predominately
done either through ships armament or through surface-to-air munitions from their flying forces.
Rarely are Navy service members expected to be deployed to conduct hand-to-hand combat or
mobilization with other ground troops. There are two exceptions to this however. The first
exception is with Navy SEALs; with the numbers of this type of Special Forces component of
the Navy remaining relatively small. The second are Navy personnel who opt to be an Individual
Augmentee (Sundin, et al. 2012). This is someone who is filling an open billet position for a
ground force troop, normally of a different branch. These two are not very common and thus it
might be more realistic to see some military branch differences in combat experience and overall
attitudinal differences among members of the different branches.

Areas for Future Research
The findings from this dissertation point to areas for future research. The use of the
combat variable designed and implemented in this dissertation can be employed as a more
refined approach to understanding the effects of military combat trauma on veterans’ political
behavior. An interesting approach could further some of the work that Teigen (2006) has done,
which focuses on the turnout of military veterans. It could be the case that veterans who have
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witnessed the effects of combat are more likely to participate in elections, than are non-combat
veterans and civilians. By experiencing combat and the trauma surrounding those experiences,
veterans may be more adamant about maintaining or changing the current leadership
administration to best fit the needs of the military and veterans in the public. Moreover, applying
the measurement of combat to policy analysis, specifically revolving around Defense or
Veteran’s Administration (VA) policy, would also highlight the difference in attitudes among
veterans (combat and non-combat) and civilians. Attitudes toward the VA are relatively low for
the public and veterans specifically (Igielnik 2019). Recent policy changes in broadening access
to outpatient facilities (Steinhauer 2019), providing an “fully developed” filing options for
claims (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 2020), and recent updates to telehealth options
(Stone 2019) provide good recent policy options to compare attitudes from those individuals
actually using these services (veterans) and those who may only hear about these policies
through secondary sources (civilians).
Additional studies on veterans’ political behavior could focus on attitudes toward running
for office, attitudes about other veterans running for office, how citizens view combat veterans
(categorized differently for different candidates) who run for office, and how the military
population of a district matters to the representation of that district. Currently, there exists
scholarship on why officers in the military would run for and win in elections (Teigen 2018).
However, given leadership qualities that are expected of and trained into military officers, I
wonder if we would expect the lack of a credible signal for enlisted military members’ leadership
characteristics to harm their chances at winning in elections. Stated differently, would being an
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enlisted military member not be enough of a draw for potential voters, and could this be why we
see some military veterans not do as well in elections?36
Additional research could focus on what type of combat a service member experiences.
Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) and Dan Crenshaw (R-TX) are two examples of veterans who have
had success running for office while having visual physical impairments from their time in the
military. There still remains a negative stigma associated with mental illness and future research
should compare visual physical injuries to mental injuries suffered from time in the military.
Given the current negative political advertising environment it would not be “beyond the pale” to
expect that opposing candidates would stoop to discussing the mental health conditions (even in
regards to veterans suffering from PTSD or other mental injuries) of their opposition.
Examining veteran population congressional district data and assessing where veterans
run for office and succeed (or fail) would be another area of veteran political behavior that future
scholars could focus on. Measuring the veteran density of a district and comparing those to areas
where veterans choose to run for office, where they win, and where they lose can provide a
unique look at another obstacle that may interfere with when veterans choose to run for office
and if their constituency more readily resembles them or not. High density areas could
potentially lead to more veterans running in those areas and success or failure might depend on
how the veteran is able to make themselves stand apart. Although, there could be an argument
that individuals in low density veteran districts would also be more appealing due to the relative
absence of veteran presence, which could help the veteran send a more credible signal about their
military service and how that translates into public service in political office.

36

It should be noted that running against an incumbent, individual candidate characteristics, and
electoral context also play a large role in election success.
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Lastly, future scholars should focus on attempting to understand the selfselection/socialization conundrum (Bachman, Sigelman and Diamond 1987, Cockerman 1978,
Schreiber 1979, Shay 1994). By using a longitudinal study of high school seniors, scholars could
start to measure attitudes and their potential evolution as individuals enter into the workforce or
military service. By measuring these attitudes over time, to the point that some of the high school
students would have joined and left the military, scholars would be able to test if military service
was enough to challenge or alter prior attitudes. This could lead to a better sense of
understanding these two theories place in the literature. Working to resolve this “chicken or the
egg” scenario should be a priority in advancing our understanding of the attitudes and
characteristics of military service members.

Summary
This dissertation sets up a better understanding of the role that trauma from military
combat has on veterans’ political behaviors. When veterans experience combat they are more
likely to identify as a veteran, support domestic military spending status quo or increases, hold
less hawkish foreign policy positions, and have more trust in the government (although that
dissipates as veterans age). The findings from this dissertation challenge prior notions of how
combat affects veterans’ behaviors. Moreover, integrating military psychology with political
behavior provides researchers with a broader look at the political psychology impact of combat
trauma for veterans’ political behavior. As I have shown with the three empirical chapters, the
trauma of combat plays a pivotal role in how veterans understand life after the military and how
their attitudes and behavior are shaped by the trauma they have witnessed while in the military.
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This dissertation began as an exploration of the effects of combat trauma on military
veterans. Using survey observations, I have shown that veterans diverge from civilians in their
political attitudes in specific ways. Specifically, using a measurement of combat that
incorporates the effects of combat trauma, I show that veterans who witness combat are also
divergent from military veterans without combat experience. These findings have implications
for future work focusing on military veterans. The use and utilization of this new combat
measurement will provide a more complete understanding of such an understudied group. While
there are various avenues that future research can continue in order to better understand military
veterans, the findings presented here demonstrate that the nuance in measuring combat according
to existing military psychology research provide new ways for researchers to better understand
military veterans’ political behavior.
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2018 QUALTRICS STUDY SURVEY QUESTION WORDING
What is your gender?
Male
Female
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Some high school or less
High School graduate
Some college
College graduate
Graduate school degree
What is your ethnicity (or race)?
Asian or Pacific Islander
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
White or Caucasian
In what year were you born?
_________________________
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an
Independent, or something else?
Democrat
Republican
Independent
Other
(If “Democrat” is selected)
Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
Strong Democrat
Not very strong Democrat
(If “Republican” is selected)
Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?
Strong Republican
Not very strong Republican
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(If “Independent” is selected)
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party, closer to the Republican Party,
or equally close to both parties?
Closer to the Democratic Party
Closer to the Republican Party
Equally close to both parties
(If “Other” is selected)
Which party is that?
____________________________
Are you now, or have you ever been a member of the United States military?
Yes
No
What branch did you serve in?
Air Force
Army
Coast Guard
National Guard
Navy
Marines
While in the military, did you:
Rows:
Witness the effects of an improvised explosive device (IED)?
Engage in gunfire exchanges with the opposition?
Witness the death of fellow service members?
Witness the death of the opposition?
Witness the death of civilian bystanders?
Columns:
Yes
No
Of the following groups how close do you feel towards them? By “close” we mean people
who are most like you in their ideas, interests, and feelings.
Row:
Veterans
Columns:
Very closely
Closely
Somewhat closely
Not closely at all
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During your time in the military were you deployed to conflict zones?
Yes
No
(If “Yes” is selected to deployment question)
If so, what country (countries) were you deployed to? [Select all that apply]
Korea
Vietnam
Lebanon
Grenada
Panama
Kuwait
Somalia
Haiti
Bosnia
Kosovo
Afghanistan
Iraq
Other
What are your views on the United State Military and its approaches to terrorism?
Rows:
The U.S. should involve themselves or should stay committed militarily in current overseas
conflicts.
The U.S. should involve themselves non-militarily (sanctions or aid) in current overseas
conflicts.
The U.S. should maintain its dominant positions as the world’s most powerful nation at all costs.
The U.S. should do everything it can to prevent the spread of terrorism to any part of the world.
Not all organizations labeled as terrorists are evil.
The U.S. should defer to international organizations (e.g. NATO or the U.N.) more frequently.
Columns:
Strongly Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Strongly Agree
Looking back on your time in the military, to what extent do you agree with each of the
following statements?
Rows:
I value the time that I spent in the military
I have no regrets about actions I was a part of while deployed.
Columns:
Strongly Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
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Somewhat Agree
Strongly Agree
How would you describe your current status from the military?
Honorable discharge
Dishonorable discharge
Other than Honorable discharge
Active Duty Military
Military Reserves
How did you enter into the military?
Draft
Volunteer
To what extent do you think of yourself as being a veteran?
A great deal
Somewhat
Very little
Not at all
Have any of the following family members served in the United States military? Please
check all that apply.
Spouse
Child
Parent
Sibling
Grandparent
Aunt/Uncle
Cousin
None
Using the feeling thermometer below, how would you rate the following? (Sliding scale 0100)
U.S. Military
For each of the following groups, please tell us how warm or cold you feel toward each,
where 100 is the warmest feeling; 0 is the coldest; and 50 is neutral. (Sliding scale 0-100)
Democrats
Republicans
Considering the situation at home and abroad:
Rows:
Do you think the total amount the U.S. is spending on defense and military purposes should be:
Columns:
Increased
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Kept at the present level
Decreased
Ended altogether
How often can you trust the federal government in Washington to do what is right?
Always
Most of the time
About half of the time
Some of the time
Never
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2012 ANES QUESTION WORDING
Are you male or female?
Male
Female
What racial or ethnic group describes you?
White, non-Hispanic
Black, non-Hispanic
Asian, native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic
Native American or Alaska Native, non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Other non-Hispanic including multiple races
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Less than high school credential
High school credential
Some post-high-school, no bachelor’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate degree
In what year were you born?
_________________
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an
Independent, or something else?
Democrat
Republican
Independent
Other
(If “Democrat” is selected)
Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
Strong Democrat
Not very strong Democrat
(If “Republican” is selected)
Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?
Strong Republican
Not very strong Republican
(If “Independent” is selected)
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Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party, closer to the Republican Party,
or equally close to both parties?
Closer to the Democratic Party
Closer to the Republican Party
Equally close to both parties
(If “Other” is selected)
Which party is that?
______________________________________________
Did you ever serve on active duty in the U. S. Armed Forces?
Yes
No
How would you rate:
the Military? (0-100)
the Democratic Party? (0-100)
the Republican Party? (0-100)
Would you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose a plan to reduce the federal budget
deficit if it included the following: [Cut military spending]
Favor
Oppose
Neither favor nor oppose
How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do
what is right?
Just about always
Most of the time
Only some of the time
Never
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SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 2
Table A2.1. Qualtrics Sample Summary Statistics
Mean

Std.
Dev.

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Combat Events (0-1)

.38

(.407)

-

-

.063

(.218)

Non-Combat = 1

.425

(.496)

-

-

.071

(.257)

Military = 1
Age (18-98)

-

-

-

-

.167

(.373)

55.71

(17.524)

44.3

(15.88)

46.2

(16.71)

Male = 1

.88

(.326)

.409

(.492)

.488

(.500)

Female = 1

.12

(.326)

.591

(.492)

.512

(.500)

Asian = 1

.03

(.171)

.054

(.226)

.050

(.218)

Black = 1

.06

(.238)

.108

(.311)

.100

(.300)

Hispanic = 1

.055

(.229)

.109

(.312)

.100

(.300)

White = 1

.855

(.353)

.729

(.445)

.75

(.433)

Some High School = 1

.13

(.337)

.113

(.317)

.116

(.320)

H.S. Graduate = 1

.25

(.434)

.295

(.456)

.288

(.453)

Some College = 1

.335

(.473)

.295

(.456)

.302

(.459)

College Graduate = 1

.205

(.405)

.189

(.391)

.192

(.394)

Graduate School = 1

.08

(.272)

.108

(.311)

.103

(.305)

Education (0-1)

.464

(.283)

.471

(.291)

.470

(.290)

Independent = 1

.155

(.363)

.219

(.414)

.208

(.406)

Republican = 1

.385

(.488)

.251

(.434)

.273

(.446)

Democrat = 1

.27

(.445)

.381

(.486)

.363

(.481)

Observations

Military

200

Non-Military

1000

Total

Table A2.2. Veteran Characteristic Themes

Characteristic/Trait
Heroism
Nationalism
Combat
Military Service
Finished with military service
Positive Characteristics
Negative Characteristics

“Military
Veteran” %
37.96
26.03
12.72
33.86
8.41
17.03
5.09
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“Combat
Veteran” %
50.60
21.40
25.40
12.60
2.00
11.60
4.80

Difference
-12.64***
4.63*
-12.68***
21.26***
6.41***
5.43**
0.29
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Table A2.3. Veteran Characteristic Themes by Military Service
Panel A: “Military Veteran”

Characteristic/Trait
Heroism
Nationalism
Combat
Military Service
Finished with military service
Positive Characteristics
Negative Characteristics

Veterans
17.86
23.21
12.50
39.29
10.71
23.21
1.79

Civilians
40.27
26.55
12.83
33.19
7.96
16.37
5.53

Difference
-22.41***
-3.34
-0.33
6.10
2.75
6.84
-3.74

Veterans
30.77
19.23
36.54
7.69
0.00
23.08
5.77

Civilians
53.03
21.35
24.27
13.03
2.25
10.11
4.72

Difference
-22.26***
-2.12
12.27*
-5.34
-2.25
12.97***
1.05

Democrats
36.04
21.32
12.69
31.92
8.12
13.71
6.09

Republicans
39.13
34.16
12.42
32.92
7.45
19.88
3.73

Difference
-3.09
-12.84***
0.27
-1.00
0.67
-6.17
2.36

Democrats
50.00
16.67
22.58
12.90
2.69
11.83
8.06

Republicans
48.21
27.38
29.76
13.69
0.60
13.10
2.98

Difference
1.79
-10.71**
-7.18
-0.79
2.09
-1.27
5.08**

Panel B: “Combat Veteran”

Characteristic/Trait
Heroism
Nationalism
Combat
Military Service
Finished with military service
Positive Characteristics
Negative Characteristics

Table A2.4. Veteran Characteristic Themes by Partisanship
Panel A: “Military Veteran”

Characteristic/Trait
Heroism
Nationalism
Combat
Military Service
Finished with military service
Positive Characteristics
Negative Characteristics
Panel B: “Combat Veteran”

Characteristic/Trait
Heroism
Nationalism
Combat
Military Service
Finished with military service
Positive Characteristics
Negative Characteristics
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Table A3.1. 2012 ANES Sample Summary Statistics
Mean
Std. Dev.
Military = 1
Age (18-98) 59.63
(15.33)
Male = 1
.91
(.286)
Female = 1
.09
(.286)
Asian = 1 .007
(.088)
Black = 1 .166
(.373)
Hispanic = 1 .121
(.326)
White = 1 .656
(.475)
Some High School = 1 .049
(.217)
Some College = 1 .414
(.493)
College Graduate = 1 .178
(.383)
Graduate School = 1 .137
(.344)
Education (0-1) .533
(.266)
Independent = 1 .128
(.334)
Republican = 1 .435
(.496)
Democrat = 1 .437
(.496)
Observations
Military
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775

Mean
Std. Dev.
.131
(.338)
47.88
(16.49)
.416
(.492)
.584
(.492)
.017
(.129)
.174
(.380)
.179
(.384)
.587
(.492)
.115
(.319)
.325
(.468)
.193
(.395)
.118
(.323)
.488
(.293)
.135
(.341)
.541
(.498)
.324
(.468)
Non-Military

5135

(2)
'Close' to
Veterans

(3)
'Close' to
Veterans

(4)
'Close' to
Veterans
0.236***
(0.0225)

-0.0106
(0.0225)
-0.0685***
(0.0259)
0.230***
(0.0535)
-0.130***
(0.0384)
0.147***
(0.0279)
-0.0113
(0.0257)
0.554***
(0.0380)

0.108***
(0.0253)
0.0804***
(0.0297)
-0.00368
(0.0223)
-0.0775***
(0.0258)
0.185***
(0.0554)
-0.141***
(0.0380)
0.137***
(0.0278)
-0.0216
(0.0256)
0.518***
(0.0398)

0.222***
(0.0228)
0.0936***
(0.0227)
0.0768***
(0.0269)
-0.00320
(0.0209)
-0.0622***
(0.0239)
0.190***
(0.0466)
-0.119***
(0.0336)
0.116***
(0.0232)
-0.0294
(0.0229)
0.510***
(0.0365)

-0.0101
(0.0211)
-0.0545**
(0.0240)
0.220***
(0.0458)
-0.111***
(0.0339)
0.123***
(0.0233)
-0.0208
(0.0230)
0.547***
(0.0346)

991
0.064

991
0.082

1,191
0.157

1,191
0.144

Military = 1
Nuclear Family = 1
Ext. Family = 1
Male = 1
White = 1
Age (0-1)
Education (0-1)
Republican = 1
Democrat = 1
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(5)
FT: Military
(0-1)

(6)
FT: Military
(0-1)

(7)
FT: Military
(0-1)

(8)
FT: Military
(0-1)

(9)
FT: Military
(0-1)

0.0686***
(0.0199)

0.0518***
(0.00827)

0.0367**
(0.0150)
0.00528
(0.0195)
0.196***
(0.0348)
-0.0192
(0.0259)
0.137***
(0.0163)
-0.0337*
(0.0190)
0.582***
(0.0271)

0.0562***
(0.0178)
0.0506**
(0.0209)
0.0386***
(0.0149)
0.000504
(0.0195)
0.176***
(0.0349)
-0.0248
(0.0261)
0.132***
(0.0164)
-0.0391**
(0.0191)
0.560***
(0.0283)

0.0609***
(0.0200)
0.0497***
(0.0177)
0.0473**
(0.0208)
0.0230
(0.0163)
0.00191
(0.0194)
0.157***
(0.0354)
-0.0295
(0.0261)
0.130***
(0.0163)
-0.0375**
(0.0190)
0.569***
(0.0284)

0.0193
(0.0164)
0.00643
(0.0194)
0.171***
(0.0354)
-0.0256
(0.0259)
0.134***
(0.0163)
-0.0324*
(0.0190)
0.590***
(0.0272)

-0.0303***
(0.00601)
-0.0328***
(0.00639)
0.115***
(0.0128)
-0.0970***
(0.0102)
0.0205**
(0.00987)
0.106***
(0.00992)
0.783***
(0.0124)

1,190
0.123

1,190
0.131

1,190
0.138

1,190
0.131

5,348
0.083

Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variables are Likert variables. Models 1-4 utilize an analysis of the
dependent variable “'Close' to Veterans” that equates to higher scores indicating closer identification with Veterans from the question, “How close do you feel
towards: Veterans.” Models 5-9 use the dependent variable “FT: Military” that equates to higher scores indicating “warmer” feelings towards the military.
Models 1-8 are from the Qualtrics Study and Model 9 is from the 2012 ANES. Reported p-values are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A3.2. Factors Associated with Veteran Social Identity (OLS)
(1)
'Close' to
Veterans

Table A3.3. Factors Associated with Veteran Social Identity (Ordered Logit)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
'Close' to 'Close' to 'Close' to 'Close' to
Veterans Veterans Veterans Veterans
Military = 1
Nuclear Family = 1

0.640***
(0.131)
Extended Family = 1
0.510***
(0.155)
Male = 1
0.301*** 0.327***
(0.114)
(0.114)
White = 1
-0.309** -0.356***
(0.133)
(0.133)
Age (0-1)
1.621*** 1.401***
(0.261)
(0.270)
Education (0-1)
-0.503*** -0.578***
(0.194)
(0.194)
Republican = 1
0.776*** 0.737***
(0.140)
(0.141)
Democrat = 1
-0.138
-0.192
(0.129)
(0.130)
/cut1
-1.502*** -1.277***
(0.207)
(0.218)
/cut2
-0.119
0.132
(0.200)
(0.213)
/cut3
1.343*** 1.617***
(0.206)
(0.222)

1.319***
(0.156)
0.509***
(0.132)
0.446***
(0.157)
0.0160
(0.119)
-0.359***
(0.136)
1.085***
(0.277)
-0.692***
(0.197)
0.724***
(0.144)
-0.157
(0.131)
-1.503***
(0.224)
-0.0664
(0.218)
1.486***
(0.227)

1.393***
(0.153)

-0.0233
(0.119)
-0.318**
(0.136)
1.226***
(0.269)
-0.641***
(0.196)
0.755***
(0.144)
-0.112
(0.130)
-1.703***
(0.213)
-0.285
(0.205)
1.253***
(0.212)

Observations
1,191
1,191
1,191
1,191
Note: Ordered logit regression coefficients with standard errors in
parentheses. The dependent variable is a Likert variable. The
dependent variable ''Close' to Veterans' is one that equates to higher
scores indicating closer identification with Veterans from the question,
'How close do you feel towards: Veterans.' Source: Qualtrics Study.
Reported p-values are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

129

Table A3.4. Military Experience and Veterans Social Identity, Military Sample
(1)
Veteran
Social ID

(2)
Veteran
Social ID

(3)
(4)
'Close' to 'Close' to
Vets (0-1) Vets (0-1)

-0.120***
(0.0364)
0.516***
(0.0744)
0.148**
(0.0701)
-0.0165
(0.0813)
-0.0331
(0.0536)
0.0373
(0.0533)
-0.118
(0.0949)
0.0452
(0.0599)
0.0871**
(0.0378)
0.0483
(0.0449)
0.369***
(0.106)

0.139***
(0.0345)
-0.0785**
(0.0352)
0.486***
(0.0736)
0.143**
(0.0673)
-0.0247
(0.0813)
-0.0304
(0.0527)
0.0460
(0.0539)
-0.0581
(0.0875)
0.0612
(0.0590)
0.0794**
(0.0370)
0.0416
(0.0445)
0.271**
(0.107)

200
0.408

200
0.441

Combat Events (0-1)
Volunteer = 1
Value Time in Military = 1
Honorable = 1
Active Duty = 1
Male = 1
White = 1
Age (0-1)
Education (0-1)
Republican
Democrat
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(5)
FT: Military
(0-1)

(6)
FT: Military
(0-1)

-0.0135
(0.0439)
0.183**
(0.0716)
0.159**
(0.0705)
0.0574
(0.0960)
-0.0277
(0.0570)
0.0724
(0.0556)
0.0378
(0.0875)
-0.0301
(0.0664)
0.0268
(0.0322)
-0.0698
(0.0436)
0.521***
(0.0947)

0.127***
(0.0373)
0.0246
(0.0442)
0.156**
(0.0701)
0.154**
(0.0690)
0.0500
(0.0930)
-0.0253
(0.0540)
0.0803
(0.0548)
0.0928
(0.0921)
-0.0155
(0.0643)
0.0199
(0.0324)
-0.0759*
(0.0436)
0.431***
(0.0982)

0.0124
(0.0389)
0.141**
(0.0592)
0.0662
(0.0520)
-0.0565
(0.0726)
0.130**
(0.0633)
0.0181
(0.0487)
-0.0896
(0.0808)
0.0721
(0.0560)
0.0896***
(0.0324)
-0.0612
(0.0445)
0.483***
(0.0871)

-0.0537
(0.0406)
-0.00368
(0.0406)
0.153**
(0.0588)
0.0684
(0.0502)
-0.0534
(0.0707)
0.129**
(0.0624)
0.0148
(0.0495)
-0.113
(0.0874)
0.0659
(0.0558)
0.0926***
(0.0325)
-0.0586
(0.0446)
0.521***
(0.0905)

200
0.180

200
0.220

200
0.189

200
0.197

Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variables
are Likert variables. Models 1 and 2 utilize an analysis of the dependent variable 'To what extent
do you think of yourself as being a veteran?' with higher scores indicating closer identification
with being a Veteran. Models 3 and 4 refer to the dependent variable 'How CLOSE do you feel
towards: Veterans. Models 5 and 6 use the dependent variable 'FT: Military' that equates to
higher scores indicating 'hotter' feelings towards the military. An analysis of Models 1-4 using
ordered logit instead of OLS yields substantively similar results. Source: Qualtrics Study
(N=200). Reported p-values are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A3.5. Feeling Toward Military and Party, Difference Among Vets and Civilians (Qualtrics)

Party

Panel A. Qualtrics Sample, Military – Republican Party
Strong Republican
Weak Republican
Independent
Weak Democrat
Strong Democrat

Veterans
11.05
24.33
34.37
48.00
39.32

N
55
43
19
33
38

Civilians
4.92
13.97
26.83
28.78
38.47

N
131
186
138
228
233

Difference
6.13*
10.35**
7.54
19.22***
0.85

N
131
186
138
228
233

Difference
-0.22
13.52**
15.70**
18.81***
8.84*

Party

Panel B. Qualtrics Sample, Military – Democratic Party
Strong Republican
Weak Republican
Independent
Weak Democrat
Strong Democrat

Veterans
56.76
55.98
41.47
17.73
-8.79

N
55
43
19
33
38

Civilians
56.98
42.46
25.77
-1.08
-17.63

Note: Full results presented are for feeling thermometer ratings for the military minus feeling
thermometer ratings for the Republican (Panel A) and Democratic (Panel B) Party. Values are
percentage differences for each group (veterans and civilians) by stated partisan identity. Source:
Qualtrics Study. Reported p-values are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Party

Table A3.6. Feeling Toward Military and Party, Difference Among Vets and Civilians (ANES)
Panel A. 2012 ANES Sample, Military – Republican Party
Strong Republican
Weak Republican
Independent
Weak Democrat
Strong Democrat

Veterans
12.91
28.90
40.28
49.60
56.16

N
124
194
89
179
224

Civilians
11.11
23.09
32.53
43.21
51.28

N
586
943
601
1,315
1,844

Difference
1.80
5.81***
7.75**
6.39***
4.88**

N
586
943
601
1,315
1,844

Difference
7.00***
8.41***
8.63**
6.67***
10.23***

Party

Panel B. 2012 ANES Sample, Military – Democratic Party
Strong Republican
Weak Republican
Independent
Weak Democrat
Strong Democrat

Veterans
74.62
56.04
38.02
16.66
17.53

N
124
194
89
179
224

Civilians
67.62
47.63
29.39
9.99
7.30

Note: Full results presented are for feeling thermometer ratings for the military minus feeling
thermometer ratings for the Republican (Panel A) and Democratic (Panel B) Party. Values are
percentage differences for each group (veterans and civilians) by stated partisan identity. Source:
2012 ANES. Reported p-values are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A3.7. Veteran Identity and Support for Decreasing Military Spending
(1)
Decrease
Mil. $ = 1
'Close' to Vets (0-1)

(2)
Decrease
Mil. $ = 1

(3)
Decrease
Mil. $ = 1

-0.196***
(0.0311)

(4)
Decrease
Mil. $ = 1

(5)
Decrease
Mil. $ = 1

-0.172***
(0.0334)

(6)
Decrease
Mil. $ = 1
-0.252**
(0.113)

Vet Social ID (0-1)
Education (0-1)
Male = 1
White = 1
Age (0-1)
Republican = 1
Democrat = 1
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(7)
Decrease
Mil. $ = 1

0.0431
(0.0373)
-0.0340
(0.0219)
0.0295
(0.0261)
-0.289***
(0.0518)
-0.172***
(0.0264)
0.0818***
(0.0249)
0.568***
(0.0352)

0.0248
(0.0368)
-0.0224
(0.0216)
0.0191
(0.0258)
-0.230***
(0.0519)
-0.143***
(0.0264)
0.0796***
(0.0246)
0.666***
(0.0383)

0.0569
(0.0406)
0.00583
(0.0240)
0.0318
(0.0274)
-0.245***
(0.0587)
-0.167***
(0.0295)
0.0800***
(0.0266)
0.544***
(0.0374)

0.0335
(0.0403)
0.00634
(0.0237)
0.0211
(0.0272)
-0.206***
(0.0585)
-0.138***
(0.0296)
0.0812***
(0.0264)
0.635***
(0.0414)

0.0334
(0.0951)
-0.160*
(0.0889)
-0.00460
(0.0831)
-0.175
(0.133)
-0.166***
(0.0607)
0.0795
(0.0695)
0.581***
(0.121)

0.0321
(0.0941)
-0.160*
(0.0880)
0.00556
(0.0824)
-0.137
(0.133)
-0.158***
(0.0601)
0.0636
(0.0692)
0.764***
(0.145)

-0.270***
(0.0932)
0.0536
(0.0936)
-0.153*
(0.0872)
-0.00967
(0.0816)
-0.171
(0.131)
-0.137**
(0.0603)
0.0984
(0.0686)
0.773***
(0.136)

1,194
0.110

1,190
0.138

994
0.089

990
0.112

200
0.123

200
0.146

200
0.160

Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is
“Do you think the total amount the U.S. is spending on defense and military purposes should be:
[Decreased = 1].” Models 1 and 2 contain the entire sample. Models 3 and 4 contain only
civilians. Models 5-7 contain only military members. An additional analysis using ordered logit
instead of OLS yields substantively similar results. Source: Qualtrics Study. Reported p-values
are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A3.8. Veteran ID, Party ID, and Support for Decreasing Military Spending
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Decrease
Decrease Decrease Decrease
Mil. $ = 1 Mil. $ = 1 Mil. $ = 1 Mil. $ = 1
Rep. x 'Close' to Vet
Dem. x 'Close' to Vet

-0.0686
(0.0782)
-0.0265
(0.0703)

-0.0562
(0.0854)
-0.0642
(0.0762)

-0.0611
(0.298)
0.396
(0.282)

Rep. x Veteran ID

0.0492
(0.231)
0.144
(0.229)

Dem. x Veteran ID
'Close' to Veterans

-0.169***
(0.0495)

-0.135**
(0.0536)

-0.398*
(0.224)

Veteran Social ID
Education (0-1)
Male = 1
White = 1
Age (0-1)
Republican
Democrat
Constant

0.0251
(0.0369)
-0.0222
(0.0217)
0.0180
(0.0259)
-0.229***
(0.0519)
-0.0984*
(0.0573)
0.0943**
(0.0456)
0.652***
(0.0432)

0.0321
(0.0404)
0.00543
(0.0238)
0.0200
(0.0273)
-0.205***
(0.0585)
-0.106*
(0.0593)
0.114**
(0.0467)
0.618***
(0.0459)

0.0526
(0.0950)
-0.162*
(0.0877)
-0.00156
(0.0823)
-0.110
(0.133)
-0.104
(0.259)
-0.249
(0.236)
0.873***
(0.215)

-0.110**
(0.0504)
0.0566
(0.0941)
-0.147*
(0.0881)
-0.00551
(0.0826)
-0.163
(0.133)
-0.173
(0.198)
-0.0150
(0.193)
0.804***
(0.154)

Observations
1,190
990
200
200
R-squared
0.139
0.113
0.161
0.162
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The
dependent variable is ‘Do you think the total amount the U.S. is spending
on defense and military purposes should be: [Decreased = 1].’ Model 1
contains the entire sample. Model 2 contains only civilian respondents.
Models 3 & 4 are military veterans only. An additional analysis using
ordered logit instead of OLS yields substantively similar results. Source:
Qualtrics Study. Reported p-values are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table A4.1. Effect of Combat on Foreign Policy Stances, Veterans Only
(1)
(2)
(3)
Hawkishness Hawkishness Hawkishness
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
Combat Events (0-1)

-0.0228
(0.0282)

-0.0224
(0.0260)
-0.0883***
(0.0222)

0.0959***
(0.0301)
0.00344
(0.0363)
-0.0111
(0.0437)
0.0611**
(0.0276)
-0.0386
(0.0294)
0.520***
(0.0556)

0.0758***
(0.0277)
0.00615
(0.0361)
-0.0215
(0.0440)
0.0683***
(0.0256)
-0.0265
(0.0299)
0.567***
(0.0565)

Regret Military Actions (0-1)
Combat x Regret
Male = 1
White = 1
Education (0-1)
Republican = 1
Democrat = 1
Constant

0.0363
(0.0344)
-0.0345
(0.0276)
-0.148***
(0.0508)
0.0704**
(0.0285)
0.00878
(0.0364)
-0.0275
(0.0421)
0.0648**
(0.0251)
-0.0282
(0.0288)
0.553***
(0.0554)

Observations
179
179
179
R-squared
0.121
0.193
0.227
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The
dependent variable is an index variable (Hawkishness) that equates to higher
scores on this variable indicating more hawkish preferences. Reported pvalues are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4.2 Question Wording Comparison
Questions Used in Hurwitz & Peffley (1987)
Would you strongly favor, not so strongly favor,
not so strongly oppose, or strongly oppose
sending U.S. troops to Central America to stop
the spread of communism?
Others feel that the best way to peace is to sit
down with other nations and work out our
disagreements.
The U.S. should maintain its dominant position as
the world’s most powerful nation at all costs.
The U.S. should do everything it can to prevent
the spread of communism to any other part of
the world.
Communism may have its problems, but it is an
acceptable form of government for some
countries.
Others feel that the best way to peace is to sit
down with other nations and work out our
disagreements.

Questions Used in Current Study
The U.S. should involve themselves or should stay
committed militarily in current overseas conflicts.
The U.S. should involve themselves non-militarily
(sanctions or aid) in current overseas conflicts.
The U.S. should maintain its dominant position as
the world’s most powerful nation at all costs.
The U.S. should do everything it can to prevent
the spread of terrorism to any part of the world.
Not all organizations labeled as terrorists are evil.
The U.S. should defer to international
organizations (e.g. NATO or the U.N.) more
frequently.
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Table A4.3. Responses to Foreign Policy Items
Civilians
(N=1,092)
Agree

61%

Veterans without
Combat Experience
(N=85)
72%

Disagree

39%

28%

28%

Agree

66%

83%

74%

Disagree

34%

17%

26%

Agree

69%

85%

84%

Disagree

31%

15%

16%

The U.S. should do everything it
can to prevent the spread of
terrorism to any part of the
world.

Agree
Disagree

81%
19%

92%
8%

86%
14%

Not all organizations labeled as
terrorists are evil.

Agree
Disagree

39%
61%

34%
66%

41%
59%

The U.S. should defer to
international organizations (e.g.
NATO or the U.N.) more
frequently.

Agree
Disagree

67%
33%

71%
29%

60%
40%

The U.S. should involve
themselves or should stay
committed militarily in current
overseas conflicts.
The U.S. should involve
themselves non-militarily
(sanctions or aid) in current
overseas conflicts.
The U.S. should maintain its
dominant position as the world's
most powerful nation at all costs.

Veterans with
Combat experience
(N=115)
72%

Note: Table presents percentages for each response to each question separately for civilians, veterans without combat experience,
and veterans with combat experience. The more “hawkish” response is bolded.
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Table A4.4. Effect of Combat on Foreign Policy Stances, Military Sample Only
(1)
(2)
(3)
Hawkishness Hawkishness Hawkishness
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
Combat Events (0-1)

-0.0249
(0.0260)

-0.0258
(0.0244)
-0.0871***
(0.0211)

0.0883***
(0.0272)
-0.00344
(0.0322)
-0.0272
(0.0394)
0.0725***
(0.0256)
-0.0296
(0.0272)
0.529***
(0.0506)

0.0700***
(0.0266)
-0.00701
(0.0325)
-0.0426
(0.0400)
0.0765***
(0.0238)
-0.0221
(0.0275)
0.584***
(0.0535)

Regret Military Actions (0-1)
Combat x Regret
Male = 1
White = 1
Education (0-1)
Republican = 1
Democrat = 1
Constant

0.0212
(0.0320)
-0.0408
(0.0280)
-0.122**
(0.0472)
0.0654**
(0.0268)
-0.00815
(0.0326)
-0.0484
(0.0389)
0.0727***
(0.0237)
-0.0248
(0.0268)
0.577***
(0.0528)

Observations
200
200
200
R-squared
0.129
0.199
0.223
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The
dependent variable is an index variable (Hawkishness) that equates to higher
scores on this variable indicating more hawkish preferences. Reported pvalues are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4.5. Service Members by Deployment
Deployed to
Korea
Vietnam
Lebanon
Grenada
Panama
Kuwait
Somalia
Haiti
Bosnia
Kosovo
Afghanistan
Iraq

%
N
11 7.97
46 33.33
4 2.90
6 4.35
7 5.07
7 5.07
2 1.45
1 0.72
4 2.90
3 2.17
26 18.84
21 15.22

138

Table A4.6. Effect of Combat and Regret on Foreign Policy Stances, by Region and Branch
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Hawkishness Hawkishness Hawkishness Hawkishness Hawkishness
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
Combat Events (0-1)
Regret Military Actions (0-1)
Combat x Regret
Male = 1
White = 1
Education (0-1)
Republican = 1
Democrat = 1
Constant

Observations
R-squared

-0.0210
(0.0813)
-0.219**
(0.0807)
-0.0148
(0.124)
-0.00977
(0.0915)
0.155***
(0.0530)
-0.0466
(0.0912)
0.0386
(0.0894)
0.0725
(0.0885)
0.568***
(0.154)

0.105
(0.0857)
0.0138
(0.0901)
-0.222**
(0.100)
0.0984**
(0.0399)
0.0959
(0.0675)
0.0876
(0.0848)
0.0980*
(0.0479)
-0.0522
(0.0528)
0.329**
(0.132)

0.0863*
(0.0505)
-0.0185
(0.0418)
-0.155**
(0.0693)
0.120***
(0.0341)
-0.0348
(0.0398)
-0.0294
(0.0596)
0.0312
(0.0373)
-0.0347
(0.0373)
0.536***
(0.0741)

0.00311
(0.0639)
-0.100**
(0.0449)
-0.111
(0.0813)
0.120**
(0.0452)
-0.0179
(0.0590)
-0.183**
(0.0802)
0.168***
(0.0500)
-0.00947
(0.0461)
0.588***
(0.109)

-0.0288
(0.0786)
-0.0410
(0.0902)
-0.0772
(0.140)
-0.00610
(0.118)
-0.00274
(0.0805)
0.0780
(0.106)
0.169**
(0.0809)
0.0667
(0.0821)
0.505***
(0.155)

44
0.403

27
0.705

87
0.188

34
0.590

39
0.269

Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is an index variable (Hawkishness) that equates to higher scores on this variable
indicating more hawkish preferences. Each Model contains a different subgroup of military
respondents: Model 1 [those deployed to Vietnam]; Model 2 [those deployed to
Iraq/Afghanistan]; Model 3 [Army]; Model 4 [Navy]; and Model 5 [Air Force]. Reported pvalues are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4.7. Effect of Combat and Regret on Foreign Policy Stances, by Party ID
(1)
(2)
(3)
Hawkishness Hawkishness Hawkishness
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
Combat Events (0-1)
Regret Military Actions (0-1)
Combat x Regret
Male = 1
White = 1
Education (0-1)
Constant

-0.0665
(0.0513)
-0.127***
(0.0387)
-0.0757
(0.0639)
0.0525
(0.0765)
0.0444
(0.0630)
0.0675
(0.0547)
0.619***
(0.129)

0.0709
(0.0579)
0.0699
(0.0487)
-0.134*
(0.0772)
0.0193
(0.0539)
0.00614
(0.0493)
0.0578
(0.0648)
0.462***
(0.0857)

0.0877*
(0.0500)
-0.0380
(0.0473)
-0.172**
(0.0848)
0.0541
(0.0336)
0.0139
(0.0331)
-0.291***
(0.0669)
0.650***
(0.0609)

Observations
77
54
69
R-squared
0.364
0.064
0.389
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The
dependent variable is an index variable (Hawkishness) that equates to higher
scores on this variable indicating more hawkish preferences. Each Model
contains a different subgroup of military respondents: Model 1
[Republicans, including leaners]; Model 2 [Democrats, including leaners];
and Model 3 [Independents]. Those who identified as some “Other Party”
are included in Model 3 with Independents. Reported p-values are twotailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4.8. Effect of Combat on 'Military First' Foreign Policy Stances, Full Sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Military First Military First Military First Military First Military First
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
Combat Events (0-1)

0.0160
(0.0426)

0.0196
(0.0396)
-0.161***
(0.0335)

0.0172
(0.0138)
0.00839
(0.0160)
-0.0284
(0.0242)
0.117***
(0.0164)
0.0137
(0.0161)
0.611***
(0.0231)

0.0921***
(0.0199)
-0.00761
(0.0151)
0.00607
(0.0159)
-0.0388
(0.0239)
0.112***
(0.0164)
0.0140
(0.0160)
0.616***
(0.0229)

0.0859***
(0.0239)
-0.00745
(0.0151)
0.00644
(0.0159)
-0.0386
(0.0239)
0.111***
(0.0164)
0.0138
(0.0160)
0.615***
(0.0229)

0.146***
(0.0249)
-0.0103
(0.0150)
0.00535
(0.0159)
-0.0430*
(0.0238)
0.112***
(0.0160)
0.0157
(0.0160)
0.618***
(0.0230)

0.0895*
(0.0478)
-0.0916**
(0.0457)
-0.180**
(0.0825)
0.120***
(0.0255)
-0.0110
(0.0150)
0.00532
(0.0159)
-0.0444*
(0.0237)
0.111***
(0.0160)
0.0151
(0.0159)
0.620***
(0.0230)

1,199
0.051

1,199
0.070

1,199
0.070

1,199
0.089

1,199
0.092

Regret Military Actions (0-1)
Combat x Regret
Military = 1
Male = 1
White = 1
Education (0-1)
Republican = 1
Democrat = 1
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The
dependent variable is an index variable (Military First) that equates to higher
scores on this variable indicating more hawkish preferences. Reported p-values are
two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4.9. Effect of Combat on 'Military First' Foreign Policy Stances, Military Sample Only

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Military First Military First Military First Military First
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
Combat Events (0-1)

0.0256
(0.0419)

0.0221
(0.0366)
-0.277***
(0.0708)

0.176***
(0.0588)
-0.0447
(0.0507)
-0.0381
(0.0578)
0.101***
(0.0368)
0.0301
(0.0436)
0.579***
(0.0836)

0.142**
(0.0546)
-0.0351
(0.0480)
-0.0531
(0.0554)
0.102***
(0.0332)
0.0385
(0.0430)
0.658***
(0.0842)

Regret Military Actions (0-1)
Combat x Regret
Male = 1
White = 1
Education (0-1)
Republican = 1
Democrat = 1
Constant

0.173***
(0.0591)
-0.0493
(0.0503)
-0.0403
(0.0577)
0.103***
(0.0364)
0.0317
(0.0439)
0.595***
(0.0811)

0.0871*
(0.0451)
-0.187**
(0.0861)
-0.167**
(0.0790)
0.133**
(0.0576)
-0.0424
(0.0491)
-0.0674
(0.0554)
0.0995***
(0.0325)
0.0375
(0.0413)
0.663***
(0.0863)

Observations
200
200
200
200
R-squared
0.098
0.100
0.208
0.233
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable
is an index variable (Military First) that equates to higher scores on this variable indicating
more hawkish preferences. Reported p-values are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4.10. Effect of Combat on 'Other Action' Foreign Policy Stances, Full Sample
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Other Action
(0-1)

Other Action
(0-1)

Other Action
(0-1)

Other Action
(0-1)

Other Action
(0-1)

-0.0778**

-0.0772**

-0.0484

(0.0384)

(0.0385)
-0.0248

(0.0483)
0.00377

(0.0311)

(0.0385)
-0.0744

Combat Events (0-1)
Regret Military Actions (0-1)
Combat x Regret
Military = 1

-0.0289

0.00108

0.0103

(0.0803)
-0.000288

Male = 1

-0.0132

(0.0178)
-0.00540

(0.0196)
-0.00616

(0.0212)
-0.00660

(0.0208)
-0.00689

White = 1

(0.0121)
0.0406***

(0.0132)
0.0413***

(0.0131)
0.0395***

(0.0132)
0.0393***

(0.0132)
0.0393***

Education (0-1)

(0.0144)
-0.0328

(0.0144)
-0.0295

(0.0143)
-0.0304

(0.0143)
-0.0310

(0.0143)
-0.0316

Republican = 1

(0.0211)
0.0213

(0.0212)
0.0230

(0.0211)
0.0246*

(0.0212)
0.0247*

(0.0212)
0.0242*

(0.0147)
-0.0482***

(0.0147)
-0.0483***

(0.0147)
-0.0475***

(0.0147)
-0.0472***

(0.0147)
-0.0474***

Democrat = 1

(0.0139)

(0.0138)

(0.0138)

(0.0138)

(0.0138)

0.486***
(0.0198)

0.484***
(0.0199)

0.485***
(0.0199)

0.486***
(0.0200)

0.486***
(0.0200)

Observations

1,199

1,199

1,199

1,199

1,199

R-squared

0.038

0.040

0.044

0.045

0.046

Constant

Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The
dependent variable is an index variable (Other Action) that equates to higher scores
on this variable indicating more hawkish preferences. Reported p-values are twotailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4.11. Effect of Combat on 'Other Action' Foreign Policy Stances, Military Sample Only
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Other Action Other Action Other Action Other Action
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
Combat Events (0-1)

-0.0755*
(0.0390)

-0.0748*
(0.0388)
0.0547
(0.0580)

0.00951
(0.0598)
0.0514
(0.0526)
-0.00973
(0.0591)
0.0369
(0.0335)
-0.0940**
(0.0401)
0.431***
(0.0843)

0.000586
(0.0579)
0.0378
(0.0524)
-0.0163
(0.0580)
0.0439
(0.0330)
-0.0893**
(0.0399)
0.478***
(0.0876)

0.00731
(0.0586)
0.0359
(0.0518)
-0.0134
(0.0580)
0.0437
(0.0330)
-0.0909**
(0.0395)
0.463***
(0.0912)

-0.0197
(0.0488)
0.131**
(0.0632)
-0.142*
(0.0721)
-3.44e-05
(0.0580)
0.0298
(0.0517)
-0.0255
(0.0590)
0.0414
(0.0325)
-0.0917**
(0.0400)
0.467***
(0.0905)

200
0.081

200
0.100

200
0.105

200
0.126

Regret Military Actions (0-1)
Combat x Regret
Male = 1
White = 1
Education (0-1)
Republican = 1
Democrat = 1
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is an index variable (Other Action) that equates to higher scores on this
variable indicating more hawkish preferences. Reported p-values are two-tailed. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4.12. Effect of Individual Combat Events and Regret on Foreign Policy Stances, Military Sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Hawkishness Hawkishness Hawkishness Hawkishness Hawkishness
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
IED Experience (1=Yes)
IED x Regret

0.00978
(0.0256)
-0.0354
(0.0410)

Gunfire Exchanges (1=Yes)

0.0411
(0.0271)
-0.104**
(0.0433)

Gunfire x Regret
See 'Friendly' Die (1=Yes)

-0.00242
(0.0271)
-0.105**
(0.0411)

'Friendly' Dead x Regret
See 'Enemy' Die (1=Yes)

0.0285
(0.0294)
-0.110***
(0.0416)

'Enemy' Dead x Regret
See Civilian Die (1=Yes)

-0.0711**
(0.0294)
0.0710***
(0.0269)
-0.00688
(0.0330)
-0.0430
(0.0401)
0.0735***
(0.0235)
-0.0242
(0.0269)
0.571***
(0.0550)

-0.0482*
(0.0259)
0.0718***
(0.0273)
0.000591
(0.0342)
-0.0461
(0.0390)
0.0715***
(0.0235)
-0.0251
(0.0265)
0.555***
(0.0512)

-0.0418
(0.0275)
0.0580**
(0.0261)
-0.0109
(0.0309)
-0.0443
(0.0386)
0.0698***
(0.0238)
-0.0293
(0.0269)
0.595***
(0.0523)

-0.0471*
(0.0272)
0.0653**
(0.0264)
-0.00263
(0.0333)
-0.0478
(0.0392)
0.0711***
(0.0239)
-0.0251
(0.0266)
0.570***
(0.0521)

-0.00308
(0.0301)
-0.0934**
(0.0435)
-0.0604**
(0.0251)
0.0668**
(0.0258)
-0.00607
(0.0307)
-0.0500
(0.0395)
0.0783***
(0.0239)
-0.0193
(0.0273)
0.580***
(0.0510)

200
0.198

200
0.219

200
0.236

200
0.223

200
0.224

Civilian Dead x Regret
Regret Military Actions (0-1)
Male = 1
White = 1
Education (0-1)
Republican = 1
Democrat = 1
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is an index variable (Hawkishness) that equates to higher scores on this variable
indicating more hawkish preferences. Reported p-values are two-tailed. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4.13. Effect of Dichotomous Combat Measure on Foreign Policy Stances, Full Sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
Hawkishness Hawkishness Hawkishness
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
Combat (1=combat; 0=no combat/civilian)

0.0264*
(0.0159)

0.0446***
(0.0167)
-0.0589***
(0.0198)

-0.00183
(0.00822)
0.0254***
(0.00871)
-0.0324**
(0.0144)
0.0672***
(0.0102)
-0.0173*
(0.00912)
0.548***
(0.0126)

0.000487
(0.00824)
0.0261***
(0.00872)
-0.0325**
(0.0145)
0.0675***
(0.0101)
-0.0168*
(0.00913)
0.548***
(0.0127)

0.0771***
(0.0190)
0.00827
(0.0254)
-0.146***
(0.0375)
-0.00465
(0.00829)
0.0238***
(0.00871)
-0.0354**
(0.0143)
0.0664***
(0.0100)
-0.0171*
(0.00910)
0.552***
(0.0126)

1,199
0.090

1,199
0.098

1,199
0.111

Regret Military Actions (0-1)
Combat x Regret
Male = 1
White = 1
Education (0-1)
Republican = 1
Democrat = 1
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The
dependent variable is an index variable (Hawkishness) that equates to higher
scores on this variable indicating more hawkish preferences. Reported p-values are
two-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A4.14. Age Range of Military Service Members
Age Range
Freq. Percent Cumulative
29 and younger 17
8.50
8.50
30-39
33
16.50
25.00
40-49
16
8.00
33.00
50-59
40
20.00
53.00
60-69
43
21.50
74.50
70-79
41
20.50
95.00
80+
10
5.00
100.00
Total
200
100.00
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SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 5
Table A5.1. Veteran Trust in Government
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Trust in
Trust in
Trust in
Trust in
Trust in
Government Government Government Government Government
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
Veteran = 1

0.0357*
(0.0204)

0.00529
(0.00959)

Past Job: Gov't = 1
White = 1
Democrat = 1
Republican = 1
Education (0-1)
Age (0-1)
Constant

-0.0411**
(0.0184)
0.0444**
(0.0177)
0.0864***
(0.0188)
0.0463*
(0.0258)
-0.152***
(0.0241)
0.388***
(0.0228)

-0.0419**
(0.0184)
0.0457**
(0.0177)
0.0850***
(0.0188)
0.0461*
(0.0258)
-0.163***
(0.0248)
0.386***
(0.0228)

-0.0640***
(0.00709)
0.0526***
(0.00972)
0.0134
(0.0103)
-0.0398***
(0.0112)
-0.00665
(0.0100)
0.445***
(0.0108)

-0.0638***
(0.00710)
0.0526***
(0.00972)
0.0132
(0.0103)
-0.0401***
(0.0112)
-0.00819
(0.0104)
0.445***
(0.0109)

0.0256*
(0.0136)
0.00630
(0.0121)
-0.0728***
(0.0126)
0.0556***
(0.0167)
-0.00578
(0.0179)
-0.0154
(0.0196)
-0.00348
(0.0177)
0.441***
(0.0195)

Observations
1,193
1,193
2,929
2,929
934
R-squared
0.060
0.063
0.069
0.069
0.098
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is a Likert variable (Trust in Government) that equates to higher scores on this
variable indicating a belief that the respondent can trust the federal government in
Washington to do what is right. Models 1 and 2 report values from the Qualtrics Study.
Models 3-5 report values from the 2012 ANES. Reported p-values are two-tailed. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5.2. Combat Experience and Trust in Government (Qualtrics Sample)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Trust in
Trust in
Trust in
Trust in
Trust in
Government Government Government Government Government
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
(0-1)
Combat Events (0-1)

0.0897***
(0.0338)

0.0614
(0.0484)

Combat x Age
Non-Combat = 1

0.212***
(0.0744)
-0.333***
(0.126)

0.0171
(0.0296)

Military = 1

-0.0411**
(0.0184)
0.0444**
(0.0177)
0.0864***
(0.0188)
0.0463*
(0.0258)
-0.152***
(0.0241)
0.388***
(0.0228)

-0.0415**
(0.0184)
0.0446**
(0.0177)
0.0832***
(0.0189)
0.0466*
(0.0257)
-0.159***
(0.0247)
0.384***
(0.0228)

-0.0791
(0.0597)
0.0470
(0.0507)
0.0578
(0.0442)
0.136**
(0.0685)
-0.231***
(0.0540)
0.433***
(0.0811)

-0.0771
(0.0588)
0.0417
(0.0500)
0.0605
(0.0435)
0.118*
(0.0678)
-0.103
(0.0721)
0.367***
(0.0837)

0.0996***
(0.0316)
-0.0486***
(0.0185)
-0.0433**
(0.0183)
0.0432**
(0.0177)
0.0811***
(0.0188)
0.0424*
(0.0257)
-0.125***
(0.0285)
0.381***
(0.0229)

1,193
0.060

1,193
0.066

200
0.195

200
0.223

1,193
0.068

Age x Military
White = 1
Democrat = 1
Republican = 1
Education (0-1)
Age (0-1)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent
variable is a Likert variable (Trust in Government) that equates to higher scores on this
variable indicating a belief that the respondent can trust the federal government in
Washington to do what is right. Models 1, 2, and 5 include the entire sample while
Models 3 and 4 are restricted to only military veterans. Reported p-values are twotailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A5.3. Sample by Age Category
Military Members
Age
N
Percent
39 and younger 50
25.0
40-59
56
28.0
60-69
43
21.5
70+
51
25.5
Total
200

Civilians
N
Percent
435
43.81
349
35.15
162
16.31
47
4.73
993
151
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